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DE FACTO DEMOLITION: THE HIDDEN
DETERIORATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING
National perception of public housing is that of a failed system in disar-
ray.' Fraught with problems such as gang warfare,2 drug dealing and re-
1. JANE A. PETERSON, NATIONAL ASS'N OF HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT OFFI-
CIALS, LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITIES IN THE 1990S 1 (1993). While early public housing
enjoyed a positive image of helping low-income employed people move to a position of
independence, this image began to change in the 1970s. Id. This change was due, in part,
to a congressional mandate requiring public housing authorities (PHA) to give preference
to the lowest-income tenants such as the elderly, disabled, and single-parent families, over
the working poor. Id. at 4. The reduction in tenant income and, thus, the reduction in
rents received, led to the physical deterioration of many of the projects. Id. Increasingly,
reduced income was not adequately redressed by federal subsidies and a scarcity of funds
led to a neglect of maintenance and modernization and to an escalation in crime and va-
cancy rates. Id
In general, public housing provides homes to more non-white, impoverished and single-
parent households than any other housing program. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECr,
PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL: A REPORT ON Tm DEMOLITION AND SALE OF PUBLIC Hous-
ING PROJECTS 15 (1990) [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL]. Increasingly, however,
negative media coverage focusing on drug activity, rising crime, deteriorated conditions,
and mismanagement has made it more difficult for public housing authorities to manage
effectively or secure the requisite congressional funds. Id.; see Tom Puleo, Plans Under-
way to Remake City's Housing Projects, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 15, 1995, at B1, B4
(reporting that in the 1940s and 1950s, the Stowe Village and Bellevue Square housing
projects were models of decent, affordable housing yet in recent years they have become
notorious drug havens and deplorable places to live); see infra notes 9-12 and accompany-
ing text (explaining how public housing conditions have deteriorated to the point that they
often merit this perception).
However, many communities are trying to correct this negative image. Cf. New Direc-
tion, LeMoyne Gardens Tests Public Housing Revamp, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis),
Nov. 11, 1994, at 12A (EDITORIAL) (describing how the Memphis Housing Authority, after
recently receiving a large Department of Housing and Urban Development grant, intended
to integrate its public housing into the community and to reform its planning process with
the hope that its actions will reverse the public's negative view of public housing); Kevin
O'Neal, Housing Grant Misses City's Goal: Scaling Down of Plans Expected, THE INDIAN-
APOLIS NEWS, Jan. 20, 1995, at B1 (reporting on the Secretary of the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Henry Cisneros's desire to change the way public housing is
perceived by giving Indianapolis a $30 million grant, 80% of which was to be spent accord-
ing to the wishes of the city rather than according to HUD instructions); Starting Over,
Grant Sets New Course for Public Housing, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Jan. 21, 1995,
at 10A (EDITORIAL) (anticipating that the forthcoming grant would allow for the creation
of successful public housing similar to that of the 1940s and 1950s); see also infra note 13
(discussing Secretary Cisneros's plan to improve the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD) efficiency and to allow the cities and local communities more
control).
2. Puleo, supra note 1, at B4. Gangs, who have only recently infiltrated Hartford,
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lated crime,3 dilapidated buildings,4 and high concentrations of poverty
and unemployment,5 the most visible and distressed public housing
projects convey a negative image that Americans associate with all public
housing.6 Yet, in reality, the distressed projects represent only six to
have found a haven in its public housing projects. Id. Specifically, they have comman-
deered the stairwells and hallways that allow gang members and drug dealers to conceal
themselves, despite the fact that residents are too fearful to remove them. Id. Similar
conditions exist in Chicago, where an eight-year old boy was ecstatic with the possibility of
leaving the Robert Taylor project, "cause we can get away from all this violence." Chicago
Public Housing Family Moves to Own Home, (Cable News Network, Dec. 24, 1994) (tran-
script # 1042-6).
3. Puleo, supra note 1, at Bi, B4. One tenant in a Hartford housing project com-
pared her apartment building to Grand Central Station due to the constant activity of drug
dealers. Id. at B4. Another tenant described watching addicts injecting themselves in the
hallways. Id. Similarly, in Washington, D.C., the drug dealers seem to run the Syphax
Garden housing project, telling maintenance men to move to a different location so that
they can continue their drug activities. Vernon Loeb, D.C. Pleased with Rate of Renova-
tions; Housing Agency Says It's Ahead of Schedule, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1995, at D.C.1.
This type of interference with maintenance is one reason for the difficulties of keeping
up with repairs and renovations. Id. For a discussion of specific problems, goals and op-
tions related to drugs and crime in public housing, see PUBLIC & ASSISTED HOUSING OC-
CUPANCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND TO THE DEP'T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 3-5 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (issuing recommenda-
tions on occupancy and management in public and assisted housing); see also HENRY CIS-
NEROS, SECRETARY, HUD, ESSAY No. 2, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: DETERRING CRIME AND
BUILDING COMMUNITY, 24-26 (1995). One part of Secretary Cisneros's essay described the
Community Partnership Against Crime (COMPAC) as HUD's latest effort to curtail vio-
lence by focusing on increased community and local police partnerships and tenant in-
volvement. Id. Specifically, Secretary Cisneros discussed "defensible space," a concept
that tries to lower crime by reconfiguring areas where incidents are most likely occur. Id.
For an in-depth look at the Chicago Housing Authority's effort to combat rampant drug
abuse and crime, see generally David E.B. Smith, Note, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Con-
stitutional Issues in Chicago's Public Housing Sweeps, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505 (1993).
4. Maudlyne Ihejirika, Wrecking Ball Claims 4 S. Side CHA Buildings, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 6 (describing some of the dilapidated conditions of a recently de-
molished project such as rotting stairs that collapsed and rats that crawled into residents'
beds). Similar conditions existed in some of Denver's projects. Hector Gutierrez, 'Brick
City' Project Tumbles into Rubble, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 31, 1994, at 5A (reporting that
sometimes as many as 1,000 residents live in the four-block project).
5. Camilo Jose Vergara, The New American Ghetto, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Nov.
1994, at 17 (describing the Chicago Housing Authority's projects as "places to load down
poor people"). Even Secretary Cisneros, in his essay, called many of the country's housing
projects "warehouses of the poor." CISNEROS, supra note 3, at 24. The remark reflects
HUD's requirement that, to qualify for HUD-funded, rental-assisted housing, a person's
income must be at or below 50% of the area's median level. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 1994 16
(1994) [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING]. For a compilation of regulations
and statutory sections controlling tenant admission to public housing, see TASK FORCE,
supra note 3, at 1-2 to 1-6.
6. Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 335, 354 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986). Bratt recognized
that millions of Americans live in decent, safe, affordable public housing but that a nega-
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seven percent of all public housing units.7 In these developments, high
vacancies and low maintenance have contributed to the increasing prob-
lem of "constructive" or "de facto demolition."'
A local public housing authority (PHA) permits a project to fall into a
state of disrepair through several types of inaction that often render the
development uninhabitable. 9 Such inaction includes failing to disburse
tive stereotype exists. Id. She argued that many of the worst projects are in large urban
areas and, therefore, are more visible to many more people; that many individuals and
interest groups are against public ownership of housing and therefore emphasize the nega-
tives; and that the excessive media coverage of those negatives rather than the successes
have all contributed to this image. Id.; see Serge F. Kovaleski, Funds to Fix Public Units
Go Unspent; D.C. Housing Failed To Use $144 Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1994, at Al.
The article revealed that the District of Columbia's Public Housing Authority had been
rated by HUD as one of the worst PHAs in the country with more than 10,000 families on
the waiting list for public housing and about 20% of its 11,796 units vacant and in need of
maintenance. Id. Such reports of a highly visible PHA in the nation's capital emphasize
the negative image of public housing.
7. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 36 (explaining that the 6-7% of public housing devel-
opments are distressed and suffer from the most severe problems); see Michael H. Schill,
Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 497, 523
(1993) (citing the 1992 National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing). This
report found that 86,000 public housing units (6% of the total stock) was distressed and in
need of rehabilitation, the cost of which would exceed 60% of their Total Development
Costs (TDC). Id. TDC comprises the cost to plan, buy the land, and construct the public
housing project. Id. For an explanation of the different types of federal funds designated
for rehabilitation, see infra note 251; see also STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra
note 5, at 14-15 (stating that the most distressed public housing projects are located in the
inner cities where the poorest Americans reside). In addition, the migration of the upper
and middle classes to the suburbs, as well as economic flight from these areas, have left the
poorest residents, often minorities, in aging and increasingly scarce public housing. Id.
8. Under 24 C.F.R. § 970.3 (1994), "demolition" is defined as "razing, in whole or in
part, of one or more permanent buildings of a public housing project." Raze is defined as
"to tear down, as an old building." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 729 (1980). "Dis-
position," often paired with demolition, is defined as "the conveyance or other transfer by
the PHA, by sale or other transaction, of any interest in the real estate of a public housing
project." 24 C.F.R. § 970.3 (1994). "De facto demolition" is not specifically defined in any
of HUD's regulations or in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1937, ch. 896
§ 2(2), 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)). Yet, the general interpretation of de facto demolition has been best characterized
as "repeated patterns of neglect, physical deterioration, tenant complaints, difficulties
keeping the project fully occupied, deliberate decisions not to rent vacant units, and judg-
ments to consolidate the remaining tenants into some portions of the project while leaving
the rest of the units vacant and boarded up." PUBLIc HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at
96-97.
9. PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 97 (citing the neglect of a PHA to
remedy ongoing maintenance problems and a failure to fill vacant units as creating an
uninhabitable housing project); see Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting) (arguing that by neglecting and abandoning a project,
a PHA is rendering that project uninhabitable to the same degree that actual demolition
would); see also THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING (1982)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. President Reagan's Executive Order 12,310 on June
1995]
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funds that have been allocated for reducing vacancy, 10 neglecting to re-
quest funds for a particular housing project while requesting those funds
for other projects,1 ' or simply refusing to conduct inspections and to re-
spond to patent problems.' 2 Thus, de facto demolition ultimately enables
the PHA to apply to the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
16, 1981 established the Commission to review and analyze federal housing policies,
homeownership, costs, and housing and mortgage finance programs, as well as to recom-
mend and advise the President on the development of, and the federal government's role
in, future national housing policy. Id. at xv. One of the specific issues examined by the
Commission was the quality of housing. Id. at 6. In its report, the Commission laid out
factors that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used to determine whether a housing
unit is inadequate. Id. at 7. Some of these factors include: absence of complete plumbing,
kitchen, or sewer facilities; breakdowns in sewer, heating, or water systems for six hours or
more during the prior 90 days; leaking roofs; exposed wiring; holes in the interior floors,
walls, or ceilings; or missing or loose steps or handrails. Id. at 7.
10. Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 815 (N.D.
I1. 1993). In Homer, the residents and applicants of the three Henry Homer projects filed
a class action suit alleging de facto demolition and a violation of § 1437p by the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) through actions that had rendered the project uninhabitable.
Id. at 809-10. One of the plaintiffs' factors in alleging de facto demolition was the rise in
vacancy rates: in 1981 the rate was 2.3% or 40 units; in 1991 it had climbed to 49.3% or 868
vacant units. Id. at 810. According to HUD regulations, a vacancy rate at or above three
percent is considered "deficient." 24 C.F.R. §§ 901.05(k), 901.10(b)(1)(vii) (1994).
To monitor a PHA's performance concerning vacancies, a PHA is required to submit a
Comprehensive Occupancy Plan (COP) to the regional HUD administrator explaining
how the PHA intends to bring the unoccupied units back "on line." Homer, 824 F. Supp.
at 810. Despite the Homer project's having the highest vacancy rate of all of the CHA
projects, in the CHA's 1990-92 COPs, Homer was slated for very minimal reductions. Id.
Even when Homer was included in the vacancy-reduction plan-349 units were to be
brought on line in 1991-only 33 of these units were successfully repaired. Id. at 811. This
inaction on the part of the CHA was coupled with the regional administrator's finding that
the Authority had not spent any of the $4,000,000 allocated to the Homer project to re-
duce vacancies. Id. at 815. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the Homer case.
11. Horner, 824 F. Supp. at 813. In comparison with the Homer projects, which had a
71% vacancy rate, funds were requested for the Cabrini Extension project, which had a
33% vacancy rate; Green Homes, which had a 51% vacancy rate; and LeClaire Extension,
which had a 3% vacancy rate. Id.; see also Schill, supra note 7, at 501 (citing a recent
study by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing estimating a cost
of between $14.5 billion and $29.2 billion to modernize public housing). The lower figure
represented simply bringing the units back to usable condition while the higher figure rep-
resented the cost of ensuring future viability, modernizing the units and ridding the
projects of lead paint. Id. at 502.
12. See Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1261-63 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In this case, the
plaintiffs claimed that the Chester Housing Authority engaged in de facto demolition by
neglecting to reduce vacancies, respond to tenants' requests for repair, keep units in a
habitable condition, and effectively instruct maintenance workers. Id. at 1260. The court
recognized a range of problems in the project including drug dealing, vandalized units,
hazardous and exposed wiring, broken windows, deteriorated floors, and an enormous
amount of trash in the stairways that residents had to climb over. Id. at 1262; see infra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing Velez in further detail).
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ment (HUD) l" for approval to demolish or dispose of the project. 4 The
PHA justifies its request on grounds that the project has become obso-
lete, is no longer suitable for housing purposes, and no reasonable
13. In 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act created the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Housing and
Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667 (1965), which combined housing
and redevelopment into one cabinet-level agency. Fenna Pit & Willem Van Vliet, Public
Housing in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 199, 208 (Elizabeth Huttman & Willem Van Vliet eds., 1988). Set-
ting an ambitious agenda for the new agency, the Act charged HUD with the "sound de-
velopment of the Nation's communities"; assisting the President in coordinating federal
activities affecting urban and suburban communities; seeking solutions to housing, mass
transit, and urban development problems; encouraging private homebuilding and mort-
gage lending; and providing for the needs of the Nation's people and communities. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development Act § 2, 79 Stat. at 667.
HUD has devised several programs over the years to deal with many of these issues.
Michael A. Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountabil-
ity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 545 (1991). Yet, quoting one commentator, Wolf called
the plethora of programs a "bewildering variety of housing-related programs." Id. HUD
recently has become a symbol of big, inefficient government that does not work. Guy
Gugliotta, Saving HUD: One Department's Risky Strategy for Radical Change, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 1995, at A4. For an in-depth look at recent housing scandals, see Wolf, supra.
Nonetheless, HUD is trying to change its image as well as fight for its own survival.
Gugliotta, supra, at A4. In January of 1995, Secretary Cisneros proposed a drastic over-
haul of the agency. Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD and
Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (statement of Henry Cisneros, Secretary, HUD). Secretary Cisneros laid out four
overall objectives: develop flexibility at the state, local and community levels; give low and
moderate income families as many choices as possible; change the financing policies; and
fulfill HUD's mission at a lower cost. Id. Much of this change involves consolidating pro-
grams, abdicating large portions of the housing assistance programs to local and state gov-
ernments, forcing PHAs to be competitive by giving residents vouchers, and a host of other
initiatives. Id. Secretary Cisneros hoped that the end result would be deregulation of the
public housing process, dissolution of those PHAs which are not effective, and placement
of public housing funds into a block grant system for which all housing providers would
compete. Gugliotta, supra, at A4.
14. PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 66. A PHA applies to HUD for per-
mission to demolish a project when:
The project or portion of the project is obsolete as to physical condition, loca-
tion or other factors, making it unusable for housing purposes, and no reasonable
program of modifications is feasible to return the project or portion of the project
to useful life; or in the case of an application proposing the demolition of only a
portion of a project, the demolition will help to assure the useful life of the re-
maining portion of the project.
42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The PHA's action or inaction that cre-
ates the de facto demolition allows the housing project to qualify under this statute. PUB-
LIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 96-97. Due to its neglect, inattention,
mismanagement, and abandonment of units, the PHA will have forced the project to be-
come unusable and impossible to rehabilitate. Id.
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program of expenditures can return the project to a viable
development.15
In the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987,16
Congress amended § 18 of the United States Housing Act of 193717
to include § 18(d), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d),' 8 which
prohibits a PHA from taking "any action" to demolish a public
housing project unless it has complied with the statutory require-
ments19 and obtained HUD approval.2° Since 1987, a majority of
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(1). Yet, tenants allege that if a PHA reaches the point where
the only avenue left is demolition and it has not complied with the statutory requirements
intended to protect residents and preserve housing units, then the PHA has violated
§ 1437p. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 817. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Homer argued that the
PHA avoided the statutory criteria of § 1437p(a),(b) and (d). Id. For the language of
§ 1437p(b), see infra note 20. For the language of § 1437p(d), see infra note 18. These
statutes were designed to be followed by the PHAs before any demolition occurred but by
engaging in de facto demolition, a housing authority could circumvent these requirements.
PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 96-97.
Applying this concept, the plaintiff-tenants who oppose de facto demolition have
brought suit under § 1437p. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 817; see Edwards v. District of Colum-
bia, 821 F.2d 651, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that the plaintiffs brought suit under
§ 1437p, alleging that by engaging in de facto demolition of the housing project, the PHA
had not complied with any of the statutory requirements which seek to involve tenants in
the demolition and relocation process, preserve units and have HUD make the decision as
to whether demolition is appropriate). In Velez v. Cisneros, the plaintiffs similarly argued
that the PHA caused de facto demolition and did not adhere to any of the statutory re-
quirements. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1260.
Once a PHA has decided to demolish a housing project, it becomes difficult to reverse
this process. Marvin Krislov, Note, Ensuring Tenant Consultation Before Public Housing Is
Demolished or Sold, 97 YALE L.J. 1745, 1747 (1988). As conditions deteriorate, units
become vacant and as vacancies increase, HUD decreases subsidies to a PHA. Id. at 1754
n.64 (citing the agency regulation). Critics of this policy claim that reduced subsidies force
PHAs to neglect maintenance. Id. This in turn leads to further deterioration enabling the
PHAs to claim that the only viable option is demolition. Id.
An example of this trend was the Houston Housing Authority, which received $10 mil-
lion to modernize the Allen Parkway Village public housing project but failed to spend
more than $50,000 of the grant. Id. at 1755-56. Critics alleged that developers and city
officials wanted to use the land to construct luxurious condominiums. Id. From 1977 until
1988, the Housing Authority officials failed to perform routine maintenance and to rent
vacant units in order to justify demolition approval by HUD. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896 § 2(2), 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). § 1437p(d) states that "[a] public
housing agency shall not take any action to demolish or dispose of a public housing project
or a portion of a public housing project without obtaining the approval of the Secretary
and satisfying the conditions specified in subsections (a) and (b) of this section." Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a), (b); see supra note 14 (quoting § 1437p(a)); see infra note 20
(quoting § 1437p(b)).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b). § 1437p(b) provides that:
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The Secretary may not approve an application or furnish assistance under this
section or under this chapter unless-
(b)(1) the application from the public housing agency has been developed in
consultation with tenants and tenant councils...
(b)(2) all tenants to be displaced as a result of the demolition or disposition
will be given assistance by the public housing agency and are relocated to other
decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing, which is, to the maximum extent
practicable, housing of their choice, including housing assisted under section
1437f of this title; and
(b)(3) the public housing agency has developed a plan for the provision of an
additional decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable dwelling unit for each public
housing dwelling unit to be demolished or disposed under such application[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1437p. However, despite these recent statutory mandates, some people con-
tinue to find fault in the system. See e.g., PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 69-84
(criticizing many aspects of HUD's demolition decision-making process). The report
faulted HUD for entering the decision-making process only after a project had already
deteriorated and criticized the agency for rarely rejecting a demolition application. Id. at
72-73; cf. Letter from Joseph Shuldiner, Assistant Secretary of HUD, to Vincent Lane,
Chairman, The Chicago Housing Authority, (Sept. 9, 1994) (on file with CATHOLIC UNI-
VERSITY LAW REVIEW) (rejecting the Chicago Housing Authority's demolition application
because the PHA had not submitted a satisfactory plan for demolition and because the
project was close to full occupancy) [hereinafter Rejection Letter].
When a PHA submits a demolition application to HUD, it is usually because adequate
resources, maintenance, and security have not been allocated to the project. PUBLIC
HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 73. In fact, "[d]emolition approval is rarely sought for
a fully occupied, decently maintained project .... Id. Rather, PHAs often apply for
demolition only after the housing project has become so dilapidated that the PHA is un-
able to envision any viable alternative. Id. Deciding on demolition, the PHA then decides
to effectively abandon the project by ceasing repairs and renovations and vacating units.
Id.; see supra note 8 (describing de facto demolition). Due to the PHA's inaction and
failure to meet any of the statutory maintenance requirements, the project falls into a state
of deterioration. E.g., Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1990). In
Tinsley, the plaintiffs alleged that the Housing Authority of Kansas City had allowed the
housing project to deteriorate to such a degree that demolition was the only viable option.
Id. For further discussion of Tinsley, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. See
also Ihejirika, Wrecking Ball Claims 4 S. Side CHA Buildings, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting
residents' comments that the Chicago Housing Authority had stopped repairing the build-
ing long before the tenants had moved out and that it was no longer prudent to invest in
rehabilitation).
In general, compliance by PHAs with the requirements of § 1437p(b) has varied. PUB-
LIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 69. Procedurally, PHAs have generally complied
with the tenant participation requirement under § 1437p(b)(1). Id. at 83-84. Yet this con-
sultation is often superficial: the PHA calls meetings on short notice; it ignores opposition;
it does not explain alternatives; or the plan which the tenants have approved is changed.
Id Consequently, one commentator has argued that "meaningful consultation must occur
before HUD approves the demolition or sale of public housing." Krislov, supra note 15, at
1747 (emphasis added). However, tenants can take control and voice their opinions in the
consultation process. Flynn McRoberts, CHA Near Resident Accord on Lakefront Build-
ings, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1994, § 2 at 7 (describing negotiations between the Chicago
Housing Authority and public housing residents over a nine-month period to ensure that
the residents' rights were not violated). Residents of the lakefront public housing projects
in Chicago agreed to vacate their projects on the understanding that once the projects were
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
courts2 1 have held that de facto demolition constitutes "any action," and
therefore violates the statute.22 Nevertheless, while lower federal courts
have recognized a tenant's right to sue under § 18, a consensus has yet to
rehabilitated they would return. Id. To ensure this promise, the residents signed a legally
binding agreement with the CHA. Id.; see also For True Housing Integration, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1994, at 10C (EDITORIAL) (demonstrating that other resident
groups have shown the same negotiating power). For a further discussion on resident
initiatives and leadership, see infra note 292.
Section 1437p(b)(2) requires that the PHA relocate the displaced residents to other safe,
decent, and affordable housing. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2). While the PHA usually does not
have difficulty fulfilling this requirement, these displaced residents are relocated to units
for which other applicants have been waiting. PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at
82. Additionally, HUD assumes that when vouchers are given for § 8 housing in place of
relocation units, this housing meets the safe, affordable and decent requirement. Id. at 83.
In reality, HUD neither checks the conditions of the units, nor ensures that tenants will
locate housing with which to use their vouchers. PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1,
at 83.
PHAs have had the most difficulty following the one-for-one replacement requirement
codified at § 1437p(b)(3). Cf. Schill, supra note 7, at 542-43 (advocating that more leeway
should be given to provide tenants with § 8 vouchers as part of the replacement require-
ment, as only a portion of replacement housing is available under the voucher system).
PHAs have often avoided or violated the replacement rule, PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL,
supra note 1, at 79, and view the rule as extremely burdensome because of the high costs
and low fund allocation. Letter from Edward L. Stacy, Assistant Executive Director,
Housing Authorities: City and County of Fresno, CA, to Joseph Shuldiner, Assistant Secre-
tary, HUD 1-2 (Apr. 13, 1994) (on file with CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.) [herein-
after Stacy Letter]. Accordingly, in reviewing initiatives to restructure HUD, President
Clinton has indicated that the one-for-one replacement rule will be abolished. Maudlyne
Ihejirika, CHA Races GOP Ax on Replacement Rule, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 23,1994, at 15.
21. See, e.g., Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (reasoning that
demolition due to the destruction of exterior walls or interior dilapidation are inter-
changeable); Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1374-75 (W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd
without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (recognizing a cause of action for de facto demolition but declining to
hold for the plaintiffs because the defendants' actions were at best negligent); Henry
Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. I11. 1991),
summ. judgment denied, 824 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. I11. 1993) (ruling that § 1437p(d) creates a
cause of action for activities that result in de facto demolition); Tinsley, 750 F. Supp. at
1007 (allowing a cause of action for de facto demolition by finding that restricting the
statute to only active demolition would undermine the congressional intent of providing
tenants with the right to bring suit for physical deterioration); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v.
Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding that the requirements of the statute
should encompass both active and de facto demolition).
22. See Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. at 321 (allowing a cause of action for de facto
demolition). But see Dessin v. Housing Auth., 783 F. Supp. 587,590 (M.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd
in part and vacated in part, 948 F.2d 730 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (mem.). The court in
Dessin held that if Congress had intended to allow a cause of action for de facto demoli-
tion, it would have stated so in the plain language of the statute. Id. While Dessin is no
longer good law, it is interesting to study the court's reasoning which accepted HUD's view
and did not recognize de facto demolition as a cause of action. Id. at 589-90. For a discus-
sion of Dessin, see infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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emerge about the requisite elements of a de facto demolition cause of
action.23
In November of 1993, HUD proposed a final rule 24 to implement
§ 1437p(d) 25 that interpreted the statute to include an intent element.
26
Therefore, to satisfy the intent requirement, a tenant would have to es-
tablish that the PHA intended to demolish the project by its failure to
maintain the units.27 The intent requirement placed a heavy burden upon
plaintiff-resident groups, increasing the difficulty of bringing a successful
suit.28 In response to opposition from tenant groups, 29 HUD withdrew
23. Compare Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 817 (stating that the court was unwilling to de-
fine its requirements for proving de facto demolition) with Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375
(indicating that plaintiffs would have "to produce evidence questioning" the PHA's need
to demolish the units or the PHA's compliance with statutory mandates).
24. Public and Indian Housing Program-Demolition or Disposition of Public and In-
dian Housing Projects-Required and Permitted PHA/IHA Actions Prior to Approval, 58
Fed. Reg. 58,784 (1993) (withdrawn) [hereinafter Final Demolition Rule].
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
26. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785. Following the enactment of
§ 1437p(d), HUD promulgated an interim rule to implement the changes made in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,984 (1988) (Interim
Rule to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 970). Following the statute, the interim rule explained
that "a PHA may not take any action to demolish or dispose of a public housing project
without obtaining HUD approval." Id. at 30,986.
During the interval between the interim rule and the proposed final rule, the court in
Gomez v. Cisneros, found that the plaintiffs had to show that the defendant PHA had a
policy of neglect allowing for de facto demolition, even though this intent requirement was
not specifically stated in the statute or the interim rule. 805 F. Supp. at 1375. When HUD
proposed its final rule on November 4, 1993, it also included an intent provision. Final
Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784-85.
The proposed final rule explained HUD's position by stating "[i]n response to Edwards,
Congress enacted section 18(d), to prevent PHAs/IHAs from intentionally evading the
statutory application and approval requirements of the demolition statute. HUD's inter-
pretation of section 18(d) thus contains an intent provision." Id. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of HUD's reasons, see infra notes 176-200 and accompanying text. Thus, the
intent provision now required a plaintiff not only to prove de facto demolition but also to
prove that the PHA intended this demolition to occur through whatever actions or inac-
tions it was taking. Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375.
27. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784 (emphasis added).
28. Telephone Interview with Director of Housing Litigation at the Legal Assistance
Foundation of Chicago (Sept. 28, 1994)(discussing HUD's withdrawn intent provision and
the burdens this would have placed on tenant groups) [hereinafter Legal Assistance Foun-
dation Interview].
29. Public and Indian Housing Program-Demolition or Disposition of Public and In-
dian Housing Projects-Required and Permitted PHA/IHA Action Prior To Approval;
Withdrawal of Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,369 (1994) [hereinafter Notice of Withdrawal].
HUD explained that the withdrawal of the rule was due to "serious concerns" expressed by
tenant groups regarding the severe impact that the requirement might place upon them.
Id; see also Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum at 19, Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (No. 90-6449) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff] (stating that "[rlequiring intent
would destroy the essence of de facto demolition"). While HUD's Final Rule was not at
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the rule in March of 1994.30 Yet, despite HUD's withdrawal of the rule,
implementation of the statute remains an unsettled issue.3'
Tenant groups and HUD offer different interpretations of the intent
requirement under the statute.32 While tenant groups support a defini-
issue in Velez, HUD contended that, in proving a cause of action for de facto demolition
under § 1437p, the plaintiffs would have to show that the PHA, whether through passive
neglect of maintenance or an active policy of vacating the units without rehabilitation,
intended to cause demolition. Id. Conversely, the plaintiffs in Velez argued that the intent
provision was contrary to the legislative history of § 1437p(d) which Congress passed to
prevent demolition unless the statutory criteria had been met. Id. To further support their
position, the plaintiffs also asserted that Congress intended to prohibit any demolition,
irrespective of intent. Id. Forcing tenants to prove intent would permit PHAs to engage in
de facto demolition simply by alleging that the destruction of the project was not their
intent. Id.
30. Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 29. The Notice of Withdrawal stated that the
final rule, "which establishes an 'intent' standard to the August 17, 1988 interim rule cur-
rently in effect, was to become effective on December 6, 1993." Id. at 14,369. Yet, the
notice stated that:
Because serious concerns had been expressed about the impact of some of the
provisions of the final rule on residents and resident organizations ... in the spirit
of cooperation, the Department further delayed the effective date ... [and] now
believes that the Department can better serve all parties concerned with this rule
by receiving public comments before issuing this rule for effect.
Id. For an elaboration of the issue of public comments, see infra notes 221-25 and accom-
panying text.
31. Telephone Interview with Assistant General Counsel, HUD, (November, 1994)
[hereinafter Assistant General Counsel Interview] (stating that, as of November, 1994,
HUD had not proposed another final rule, thus leaving the 1988 interim rule still in effect).
Not only did the final rule require proof of intent, but it also specified that de facto demoli-
tion did not constitute actual demolition and, therefore, did not fall under the statute's
prohibition. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784 n.3. Therefore, HUD's with-
drawal of the final rule left unanswered the issues of whether de facto demolition is in-
cluded under demolition as a cause of action and whether plaintiffs must prove intent.
An illustration of the unsettled nature of this issue occurred in Washington, D.C. when
Judge Steffen Graae ordered the city to surrender its public housing authority to a receiver.
See Serge F. Kovaleski, Court Delays Takeover of D.C. Public Housing; City Will Retain
Authority Until Its Appeal Is Heard, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1994, at B1. Opposing this order,
the District of Columbia argued that its failure to rehabilitate units was not constructive
demolition and a federal violation, as Judge Graae had found. Id. at B4. In disputing this
order, the District argued that only intentional demolition, not neglect, is controlled by the
statute. Id. But see Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1271, 1273 n.7 (illustrating that, in the most
recent case regarding de facto demolition, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania found that de facto demolition was included in the statutory definition of
demolition and that the plaintiffs need not show intent).
32. In two of the three recent cases where the court has considered the issue of intent,
plaintiff/tenants have argued against an interpretation requiring intent. See Brief for Plain-
tiff, supra note 29, at 19 (maintaining that plaintiffs did not have to prove intent); Henry
Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 818-19 (N.D. I11. 1993)
(rejecting the necessity of proving intent). But see, Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp.
1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d
1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (noting that the plaintiffs did not
argue against an intent provision but nor did they provide any evidence of intent). Plain-
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tion of demolition that includes de facto demolition, they oppose vehe-
mently the inclusion of an intent provision.33 Prior to judicial recognition
of de facto demolition as a cause of action, tenant groups unsuccessfully
sued PHAs for mismanagement and deteriorated conditions of public
housing units.34 Conversely, these groups have prevailed when challeng-
ing housing authorities for violations resulting in de facto demolition
under § 1437p(d).35
Unlike tenant groups, HUD interprets "demolition" to mean razing
36
and excludes from this definition mere failure to maintain public housing
tiffs' failure to address the intent issue in Gomez may be explained by the fact that prior to
Gomez, intent had not become an issue and no court had found that this was a necessary
element. Contra Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785 (revising the regulations
to require proof of intent).
33. National Housing Law Project, The "De Facto" Demolition Regulation, Oakland,
CA 3 (1993) (unpublished position paper, on file with CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW RE-
VIEW) [hereinafter NHLP Paper]. The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) is one of
the tenant groups that lobbied HUD to withdraw the rule. Telephone Interview with
Housing Management Specialist, HUD (Sept. 1994) (discussing the withdrawal of the rule)
[hereinafter Housing Specialist Interview]. The NHLP position paper attacked HUD's in-
tent requirement by analyzing previous case law, the legislative history of § 1437p(d), and
HUD's procedural process for proposing the rule. NHLP Paper, supra, at 2-5. For a dis-
cussion of the NHLP's arguments, see infra notes 202-25 and accompanying text. See also
Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 29, at 14,369 (indicating that HUD withdrew the final
rule in response to serious opposition concerning the provision's negative impact on
tenants).
34. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4; see also infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text (discussing plaintiffs' lack of success generally in bringing a cause of action for deterio-
rated conditions under the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC)). For a discussion of the
role of the ACC in public housing, see infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
35. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4. But see Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821
F.2d 651, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "neither the language nor the legislative
history of § 1437p creates rights in public housing tenants against the constructive demoli-
tion of their units"). In Edwards, the plaintiffs alleged that the PHA had "embarked upon
a program to demolish public housing" with no regard for the statutory requirements. Id.
at 653. The court rejected the plaintiffs' complaint under § 1437p, holding that neither the
legislative history nor the statute created a cause of action for de facto demolition. Id. at
659.
Following the Edwards decision, courts have ruled for plaintiffs by reasoning that
§ 1437p(d), enacted "to correct the [Edwards court's] erroneous interpretation of the ex-
isting statute," created a cause of action for de facto demolition. See supra note 21 (detail-
ing recent court rulings in favor of including de facto demolition in a cause of action); see
also Maudlyne Ihejirika, Lane Takes Aim Again at Homer Homes Annex, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1994, at 22 (highlighting the impact of § 1437p on the Chicago Housing Author-
ity's (CHA) efforts to negotiate a settlement with Homer residents who accused the CHA
of de facto demolition). A failed settlement resulting in trial would be a continuation of
the 1993 case in which the court approved de facto demolition as a cause of action but
stated that the uncertainties of the case warranted a trial. Henry Homer Mothers Guild v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817-18 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
36. 24 C.F.R. § 970.3 (1994). In Velez, the court, quoting Webster's Dictionary, stated
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through inaction, neglect, or negligence.37 Additionally, under the with-
drawn rule, HUD interpreted the statute to require proof that the PHA's
actions, the alleged de facto demolition, was the result of an intent to
demolish.38 HUD articulated this position before the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1994.19 Arguing
that the plain statutory language required proof of intent, HUD main-
tained that plaintiffs had to establish a nexus between the actions taken
and the razing or demolition of the building.4 °
Similarly, federal courts have split on the issue of intent.41 In 1992, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held in
Gomez v. Housing Authority, that plaintiffs must show a plan or scheme
by a PHA that allowed units to remain vacant or in such disrepair that
they were de facto demolished.42 If courts followed this decision, plain-
that razing means, "'to tear down completely; level to the ground.'" Velez v. Cisneros,
850 F. Supp. 1257, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
37. Federal Defendants' Motion For Judgment Pursuant To Rule 52 And Post-Trial
Memorandum, at 24, Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 90-6449)
[hereinafter Brief for Defendant, HUD]. HUD supported this argument by stating that
Congress was aware of HUD's definition interpreting demolition to mean razing when it
enacted § 18(d) of the Housing Act of 1937 (§ 1437p(d)). Id. Therefore, Congress could
have explicitly stated that actions or inactions resulting in de facto demolition were to be
included in this definition. Id. at 24-25. Since Congress did not address this issue, HUD
argued that Congress "implicitly ratified" HUD's definition. Id. at 25. HUD clearly
stated this position in its final rule. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784 n.3.
38. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785; see infra notes 182-200 and ac-
companying text (explaining HUD's interpretation in more detail).
39. Brief for Defendant, HUD, supra note 37, at 20.
40. Id. HUD contended that the statute's language, which provides that a PHA "shall
not take any action to demolish or dispose of," meant that there is a link between the
words "action" and "demolish." Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (1988)). Therefore,
any action taken by a PHA must be taken with the intent to demolish. Id. For a detailed
look at this portion of HUD's argument, see infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
41. Three federal district courts have considered the issue of whether intent is a neces-
sary element for a cause of action under § 1437p(d). See Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp.
1257, 1273 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (ruling that plaintiffs need not show intent); Henry Homer
Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 818-19 (N.D. I11. 1993) (holding
that a showing of de facto demolition does not require proof of intent); Gomez v. Housing
Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992) aff'd without op. sub nom. Gomez v. City
of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (holding that
plaintiffs must show evidence of a plan by the PHA to demolish).
42. Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375 (holding that the plaintiffs had to show that the hous-
ing authority had a policy of allowing the units to deteriorate). In Gomez, the plaintiffs
brought an action against the Housing Authority for the City of El Paso alleging that the
Housing Authority's failure to maintain and effectively manage the units resulted in unin-
habitable vacant units which were effectively demolished. Id. at 1367. Since the Housing
Authority failed meet any of the statutory requirements set out in § 1437p before the al-
leged de facto demolition occurred, the plaintiffs brought suit under the statute. Id. While
the Gomez court recognized an action for de facto demolition, it held that plaintiffs had
failed to show that the PHA had a policy or plan of allowing its units to become vacant in
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tiffs would have to prove that by action or omission, the PHA intended to
demolish the units.43 In contrast, in 1994, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Velez v. Cisneros
that plaintiffs are not required to show that the housing authority in-
tended de facto demolition by its actions.'
This Comment argues that an intent requirement is unfairly prejudicial
against tenant suits under § 1437p(d). Further, this Comment asserts that
an intent requirement impedes the statute's goal of prohibiting the de
facto demolition of public housing by neglect. First, this Comment exam-
ines the case law, statutory law, and legislative history supporting de facto
demolition as a cause of action for tenants against a PHA. Next, this
Comment reviews and critiques HUD's rationale for proposing intent as
an element in bringing suit under § 1437p(d). This Comment then ad-
order to demolish them. Id. at 1375. The court, therefore, followed HUD's definition of
demolition and read an intent requirement into the statute. Id For a detailed discussion
of Gomez, see infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
43. Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375 (emphasis added); cf. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818 n.8
(disagreeing with the Gomez court's requirement of proving that the PHA's policy, which
to the Homer court was the equivalent of intent, caused the demolition). The Homer
court stated that "it [did] not agree with Gomez in this regard." Id. Similarly, but without
citing the Gomez case, the court in Velez v. Cisneros also refused to interpret the statute
as requiring intent. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273 n.3.
Yet while the Gomez court and HUD have interpreted § 1437p(d) to require intent,
neither has specified how a plaintiff might prove intent. See Final Demolition Rule, supra
note 24, at 58,784-85 (stating that the statute includes an intent requirement, yet omitting
any factors that a plaintiff would have to allege in order to prove intent). In Gomez, the
court held that the plaintiffs did not offer evidence showing that PHA action or inaction
had demolished the units, evidence "questioning the need to demolish [the] units," or evi-
dence challenging the PHA's fulfillment of the statutory requirements. Gomez, 805 F.
Supp. at 1375.
These types of issues may have caused HUD to deny the Chicago Housing Authority's
(CHA) request for demolition of 109 units at the Henry Homer Annex. See Rejection
Letter, supra note 20. For example, in declining to approve the CHA's demolition request,
Assistant Secretary Shuldiner questioned the CHA's plan to demolish a building that was
close to full occupancy when there were other high-rises with many more vacancies. Id.;
see also Maudlyne Ihejirika, Homer Resident Fights for Home, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14,
1994, at 1 (supporting HUD's questioning of the CHA by noting that, coincidentally, the
Homer Annex is adjacent to the stadium that will host the 1996 Democratic National Con-
vention). Tenants also asserted that stadium owners and the city want to demolish the
housing project prior to the Convention. Id. The CHA and Mayor Daley have denied
these allegations. Id.
Yet, the CHA is now involved in litigation brought by residents of the Henry Homer
Annex who have alleged de facto demolition and Assistant Secretary Shuldiner empha-
sized the litigation in his denial letter to the CHA. See Rejection Letter, supra note 20.
Consequently, HUD appears to be acting cautiously in approving demolition requests for
questionable reasons and may be mindful of the Gomez court's "factors."
44. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273 n.7. For the facts of Velez, see supra notes 100-05 and
accompanying text.
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dresses tenant groups' proposals concerning the fair enforcement of the
statute. This Comment concludes that the most effective way to accom-
plish the statutory goals is through a proactive response that prevents
demolition before it occurs.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF § 1437p: PREVENTING DEMOLITION WITHOUT
HUD APPROVAL
A. The Emergence and Affirmation of De Facto Demolition as a
Cause of Action
When the federal government first instituted public housing under the
Housing Act of 1937,: it did not provide a cause of action for de facto
demolition. 6 Congress passed the Housing Act "for the elimination of
unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for
the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low
income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of
business activity ....47 The 1937 Housing Act created a system whereby
45. The Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437p (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
46. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. 81 CONG. REC. 8097 (1937) (reporting on the Senate discussion of the Housing
Act). One of the many reasons for this first national public housing effort, which Congress
enacted during the Depression, was that many people had lost their homes due to bank
foreclosures. Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common
Law that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681, 686 (1994). For
the first time, middle class families were forced to move into slum areas due to a scarcity of
affordable housing. Id. This development may have spurred the federal government to
enact a comprehensive policy. Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990's,
20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 727, 727 (1987). This new policy also may have represented an
acknowledgment that private industry could not satisfy the housing needs of low-income
people and, therefore, the federal government had to intervene. Pit & Van Vliet, supra
note 13, at 205.
Whether society actually empathized with the lower-class or not, the middle-class
wanted to eradicate the slums, where poverty, disease, and crime were creating health and
moral hazards. Id. at 205-06. Codes were enacted to address these concerns as well as to
provide minimum standards for housing conditions. Green, supra, at 686-87. But upon
the creation of the Housing Act of 1937, the private sector, fearing opposition, provided
enormous opposition. Bratt, supra note 6, at 337. Thus, due to the intense lobbying effort
by real estate boards, mortgage banking organizations and savings and loan associations,
the Housing Act placed "low-ceilings" on expenditures to ensure that the buildings would
not be competitive with the private sector. Schill, supra note 7, at 502-03. In light of these
limits, many buildings were constructed with small rooms, poor noise insulation,
nondurable materials for interior structures, and antiquated plumbing, heating and electri-
cal equipment to ensure the lowest possible costs. Id. at 503.
To finance this public housing, initially provided only for the fallen middle-class, the Act
required tenants to pay for operating expenses through their rental payments. Schill, supra
note 7, at 499. While this system worked well at the outset, the demographics of public
housing tenants began to change. Bratt, supra note 6, at 338. For example, following
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local public housing agencies were formed to erect, own, and run housing
for low-income tenants.48
World War II, many of the original public housing tenants achieved middle-class status
and moved into private sector homes. Id. Additionally, in 1949, Congress mandated that
only the lowest-income people could live in public housing by lowering the amount of rent
PHAs could charge and ordering eviction of those able to pay more. Id. at 399. During
the 1960s many African-Americans moved north and into the urban areas, dramatically
increasing the minority percentage in public housing to 65%. Pit & Van Vliet, supra note
13, at 208.
Due to aging buildings and inflation, operating costs rose in the 1960s. Schill, supra note
7, at 505. Tenants' rental payments no longer covered these costs and for the first time the
Public Housing Administration, which later became HUD, began granting subsidies to in-
dividual households. Bratt, supra note 6, at 399. To protect tenants from increasing oper-
ating costs, Congress passed the Brooke Amendment, which capped rental payments at
25% of income and increased operating subsidies. Schill, supra note 7, at 505. Operating
expenses skyrocketed, increasing from $12.6 million to $102.8 million between 1969 and
1972 and growing to $1.3 billion from 1971 to 1982. Bratt, supra note 6, at 399.
Additional appeasement of public housing opponents came in the form of a decentral-
ized system. Id. at 340. Local authorities determined where the housing would be located,
and bowing to local pressure, concentrated the projects in urban areas. Id. In addition,
local control allowed officials to continue patterns of racial segregation. Id. For a detailed
look at the issue of segregation, see Elizabeth B. Bowling, Viewing Metropolitan Housing
Authorities as Parties to be Joined, if Feasible, in Fair Housing Suits: Will Minnesota Break a
Great Silence?, 78 MINN. L. REv. 733 (1994). The Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 sought to remedy the problem of concentrated poverty by establishing selec-
tion criteria to include families with a wide range of income levels. Schill, supra note 7, at
512. Additionally the Act eliminated the set income ceilings and the forced evictions of
tenants who earned more than a specified income. Id. at 512-13.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration took the position that only the very poor should
receive the scarce housing resources. Id. In 1981, Congress mandated that 90% of the
tenants in existing public housing and 95% of the tenants in newly built housing must have
very low incomes. Id. Furthermore, the Administration raised the base rent from 25% to
30% of income but reserved only 10% of available housing for those with higher incomes.
Pit & Van Vliet, supra note 13, at 210. This forced many of the more prosperous tenants to
vacate and exacerbated the concentration of the very poor in public housing. Id. The
Administration also lowered the rent ceiling for § 8 housing as well as the standards for
public housing. Id. For a description of § 8, see infra note 266. Overall, the policies of the
Reagan Administration caused a dramatic increase in homelessness due, in large part, to
the lack of affordable housing, which was reserved only for a very small segment of the
population. McDougall, supra, at 760-61.
In 1983, the percentage of low-income families decreased to 75% in old housing and
85% in newly constructed housing. Schill, supra note 7, at 513. In 1992, the percentage
dropped to 50%. Id. Yet, the number of poor people concentrated in the oldest and most
run-down buildings continues to rise at the same time that rents continue to rise. STATE OF
THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 5, at 15. By 1994, rent payments of $200-300 were
insufficient to cover a housing project's operating expenses. Id. If the operating costs
cannot be paid, the owner of the project divests from the property, allowing the project to
fall into a state of disrepair and demolition becomes the only viable solution. Id. As a
result, the housing stock continues to decrease, making it more difficult for people to gain
access to assisted housing. Id. Between 1985 and 1991, the housing stock decreased by
130,000 units per year, of which 100,000 units were demolished. Id. at 16.
48. Schill, supra note 7, at 499 (outlining briefly the role of a public housing authority);
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Once a locality decides to develop low-income housing, it forms a
PHA, that contracts with the federal government.49 The contract, termed
the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC),5 ° allows the PHA to buy
land, often through long-term bonds,5' and requires that the housing au-
thority agree to follow federal standards for maintenance, replacement
housing, and other such concerns. 5 2 In return, the federal government
pays the interest on the financial instrument used to purchase the land,
and the local municipality agrees to waive property taxes. 3 Through the
ACC, HUD also pledges certain subsidies in exchange for a PHA's com-
mitment to meet such requirements as: maintaining housing quality stan-
dards, 54 imposing limitations on rental charges,5 5 and including specific
lease provisions between tenants and PHAs 6 Currently there are 3,308
PHAs nationally. 7
see also McDougall, supra note 47, at 762-63 (explaining the emphasis on local control).
While the Depression forced the federal government to intercede, the tendency has always
been to delegate housing policy discretion to local officials who are closer to the commu-
nity. Id. One commentator has argued that effective housing policy must be developed in
the context of community development, which includes employment, transportation, and
social concerns. Id.
49. Schill, supra note 7, at 499 n.12 (explaining that before PHAs were created, the
federal government had been unable to secure land for housing purposes because courts
had held such action unconstitutional under the Takings Clause).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. Bratt, supra note 6, at 398 (explaining that the federal government agreed to pay
the principal and interest on the bonds offered by the local housing authority to finance a
particular housing project on the understanding that the PHA would be responsible for
operating expenses); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a)(1) (stating that HUD is responsible for
no more than the interest and principal payments on bonds issued by the PHA).
52. Schill, supra note 7, at 500 (stating that part of the PHA's responsibilities is to
maintain its buildings in compliance with HUD standards); see 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(j) (listing
some of the obligations imposed on PHAs); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at
31 (listing procedures and policies that the federal government requires PHAs to follow in
the areas of labor agreements, evictions, grievances, accounting, contracting, and tenant
selection).
53. Schill, supra note 7, at 499-500.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(j).
55. Paul E. Harner, Implied Private Rights of Action Under The United States Housing
Act of 1937, 1987 DUKE L.J. 915, 915 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III
1985)) (the "Brooke Amendment"). The Brooke Amendment ended the requirement of
minimum rents and instead obligated tenants to pay a maximum of 25% of their income.
PETERSON, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining the effects of the Brooke Amendment).
Although the percentage was later raised to 30%, the Brooke Amendment still resulted in
a large reduction in PHA income. Id. Critics have blamed this amendment, in part, for the
physical deterioration of public housing as PHAs, with reduced incomes, cut maintenance
budgets in order to survive. See id.
56. Harner, supra note 55, at 915.
57. National Ass'n of Housing and Redevelopment Officers (NAHRO) Public Hous-
ing Program Nationwide, 1994 NAHRO Agency Survey (detailing the number of Housing
Authorities by size nationwide). In 1994, these PHAs will receive $2.9 billion in operating
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Under present statutory and agency regulations,5" if a PHA wishes to
demolish a project it must submit an application to HUD and have com-
plied with requirements59 outlined in § 1437p(b).6 ° If the PHA fails to
meet these requirements and HUD approves the application, a tenant has
a cause of action under § 143 7p.61 Edwards v. District of Columbia62 first
considered the issue of whether plaintiffs could bring a cause of action
under § 1437p for de facto demolition.63
The case arose when tenants brought suit under § 1437p, alleging that
the District of Columbia Housing Authority had engaged in de facto
demolition of the Fort Dupont low-income housing project.64 The court
dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, holding that the plain mean-
ing of the statute did not provide a cause of action for de facto demoli-
tion.65  As a result of this ruling, PHAs could evade the statutory
requirements for demolition approval by simply allowing a building to
become demolished through neglect.
66
In response to the court's interpretation of § 1437p in Edwards, Con-
gress passed an amendment, § 18(d), codified at § § 1437p(d),67 in the
subsidies for public housing. Id. They will also receive $3.7 billion for public housing mod-
ernization from the federal government. NAHRO Funding, HUD Program, Fiscal Years
1987-1995 (1994) (explaining HUD funding for public housing operating subsidies and
modernization).
58. 24 C.F.R. § 970.4 (1994) (describing the general requirements that a PHA must
meet before HUD will grant demolition approval).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992); see supra note 20 (quoting the re-
quirements in § 1437p(b)).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b).
61. E.g., Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Conn. 1988)
(holding that § 1437p created enforceable rights for the tenants).
62. 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 653 (addressing the argument that de facto demolition was the equivalent of
actual demolition and that even though HUD had not approved the application, defend-
ant-PHA had engaged in activities that rendered the project demolished).
64. Id. The plaintiffs based their cause of action on the Housing Authority's failure to
meet with tenant groups, to maintain the vacant units, to take any action to fill the vacant
units, and to provide acceptable relocation housing. Id.; see supra note 20 (outlining the
requirements for demolition application approval under § 1437p(b)).
65. Edwards, 821 F.2d at 659-60 (holding that while the PHA might be neglecting the
project and causing it to become as uninhabitable as if it were actually razed, the statute
did not prohibit this action). Contra id at 669 (Will, J., dissenting) (arguing that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437p placed a duty on a PHA not to abandon the project unless it met the statutory
requirements and gained HUD approval).
66. See id at 666 (Will, J., dissenting).
67. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896 32(2), 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see supra note 18 (quoting the
specific language of the amendment).
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1987 Housing and Community Development Act.68 In the amendment's
legislative history, the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Com-
mittee specified that it was "correcting... [the Edwards court's] errone-
ous interpretation of the existing statute" in Edwards and that a suit for
de facto demolition could be brought by tenants and applicants for public
housing.69 The Committee's goal in creating the amendment was the
preservation and expansion of existing public housing units for eligible
tenants.7o
One of the early cases interpreting the amendment was Concerned Ten-
ants Association v. Pierce.71 This class action suit on behalf of 700 tenants
of a low-income housing project in Bridgeport, Connecticut alleged de
facto demolition in violation of § 1437p.72 The United States District
Court of Connecticut rationalized that if it followed the majority in Ed-
wards,73 a cause of action would be permitted only for the affirmative
destruction of the housing projects.74 After a review of the legislative
history of § 1437p, the court concluded that Congress's intent was to pre-
vent the destruction of public housing without HUD's approval.75 The
court then determined that Congress, by the words "any action," in-
tended to broaden the type of prohibited activity to include neglect con-
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1988 & Supp. III 1992); see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 426, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3458, 3469.
69. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 426, supra note 68, at 172, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3469.
70. H.R. REP. No. 122(1), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3341. In the legislative history, the House Committee recognized the
need for affordable housing and, therefore, wished to preserve viable units as long as mod-
ernization or rehabilitation would permit. Id. The amendment also noted that tenants
were provided an enforceable right to prevent demolition or disposition if the PHA failed
to comply with statutory requirements. Id. Furthermore, the House Committee stressed
that the amendment's goal was to add to the number of available units. Id. at 26, reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3342.
71. 685 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Conn. 1988).
72. Id. at 318-19 (alleging that the deteriorated conditions included unsecured doors
which allowed drug dealing and robberies to occur; a failure to repair the myriad of broken
appliances, fixtures and structures; infestation by rodents and termites as well as hallways
filled with garbage).
73. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra notes
62-70 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards and its impact).
74. Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. at 320-21.
75. Id. at 321; see supra note 70 (explaining Congress's intent to preserve and add to
the supply of viable housing units).
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tributing to the demolition of a project.76 Thus, the court held that the
plaintiffs had established a cause of action."
Following Concerned Tenants,78 the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri, in Tinsley v. Kemp ,7 also found that
limiting a cause of action to only the actual physical demolition of a pro-
ject weakens the effectiveness of Congress's intent in enacting the statu-
tory amendment. 80 In Tinsley, the tenants in Watkins Homes housing
project brought suit alleging that the PHA had violated § 1437p by its
passive neglect of the project.8 ' Out of 288 units in the Watkins Homes
project, 118 were vacant.82 The tenants claimed that the Housing Au-
thority of Kansas City neglected to consult with them about replacement
housing and, therefore, did not formulate a plan for re-housing tenants
after the demolition. 3 Based on the legislative history of the statute, the
court recognized the tenants' cause of action for de facto demolition
under § 1437p.
84
Despite these two federal district court decisions interpreting the stat-
ute to allow a cause of action for de facto demolition,8" the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Dessin v. Housing
Authority86 adopted a different view of the plain meaning of the statute,
76. Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. at 321; see also Edwards, 821 F.2d at 666 (Will, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that, for the statute to be effective, it must allow a cause of action
against a PHA if, by the PHA's inaction and neglect, the building becomes effectively
demolished).
77. Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. at 321.
78. Id. (recognizing a cause of action for de facto demolition under § 1437p).
79. 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
80. Id. at 1007 (reasoning that if the court prohibited a cause of action for de facto
demolition, PHAs would be able to circumvent the statute by allowing the projects to
deteriorate).
81. Id. at 1003. In this case, the number of vacant units in the 288 unit Watkins Homes
housing project exploded from 35 in 1988 to 188 in 1990. Id. at 1004. The plaintiffs alleged
that the PHA violated the statute by allowing the vacant units to fill with trash, human
waste and vermin; exist with broken windows and without window frames, appliances,
counter tops and cabinets; and become available to drug dealers and trespassers. Id.
82. Id. at 1003 (finding that, while HUD had approved demolition of 60 units, 288
remained for which HUD had not approved a demolition order).
83. Id.; see supra note 20 (quoting the statutory requirements of § 1437p(b)).
84. Tinsley, 750 F. Supp. at 1007-08.
85. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting the Concerned Tenants hold-
ing that § 1437p should encompass both de facto and actual demolition); see supra note 84
and accompanying text (citing the Tinsley court's ruling that § 1437p should allow for a
cause of action for either actual or de facto demolition).
86. Dessin v. Housing Auth., 783 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd in part and
vacated in part, 948 F.2d 730 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (mem.); see infra note 89 (ex-
plaining the reasons for the vacated decision).
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one that was consistent with HUD's statutory interpretation.87 In Des-
sin, the tenants sought to enjoin the Housing Authority of the City of Fort
Myers and HUD from taking further action toward demolition of the
Southward Village housing project. 88 The court ruled that the defendants
had not fulfilled the statutory requirements of tenant consultation and
formulation of a plan for post-demolition. 89 Nonetheless, the court re-
jected the tenants' cause of action, reasoning that HUD's interpretation
of demolition as razing should be given considerable weight and finding
the statute's plain language unambiguous.'
Other courts have declined to follow the Dessin decision.91 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held, in Henry
Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Housing Authority,92 that § 1437p(d)
incorporates a right to challenge actions that result in de facto demoli-
tion.93 In repudiating Dessin, the court relied on the Edwards dissent's
87. Id. at 589-90 (declining to find a cause of action for de facto demolition under
§ 1437 p).
88. Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 588. But see id. at 588-89 (finding that the project was vacated at HUD's
direction due to unsafe conditions, not an intent to demolish). The Dessin court disagreed
with the plaintiffs' contention that their relocation resulted from the housing authority's
demolition plans and determined that HUD had properly required relocation due to un-
safe conditions. Id. at 588. However, the court did not adequately address how those
conditions came about and whether the conditions that forced HUD to require relocation
were due to the PHA's negligence or inaction, which in other cases led to a cause of action
for de facto demolition. E.g., Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.
Conn. 1988) (holding that the words "any action" in the statute 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d)(1988)
prohibiting demolition, extended to any inaction or negligence that may have led to the
deterioration of the project). In Dessin, the PHA argued that the construction defects and
drug dealing had caused the decrepit conditions, but the court did not consider whether
these reasons were legitimate. Dessin v. Hous. Auth., No. 90-4069, at 2 (11th Cir. Oct. 30,
1991) (explaining that the decision was later vacated and remanded because a finding of
fact was made by the District Court without affording plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate).
In Dessin, the court found that the relocation of former tenants was not part of the Hous-
ing Authority's plan to dispose of the property, despite evidence in the record to the con-
trary. Id. The 11th Circuit then remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of the ripeness of the plaintiff's challenge. Id. While Dessin is not precedent, it remains a
worthwhile analysis of the definition of demolition and intent.
90. Id. at 590.
91. See Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that de facto demolition constituted a cause of action under
§ 1437p); Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1271 (rejecting HUD's definition that ex-
cludes de facto demolition).
92. Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill.
1991), summ. judgment denied, 824 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting the Chicago
Housing Authority's motion to dismiss and determining that § 1437p(d) created an en-
forceable cause of action for de facto demolition).
93. Id. at 515 (finding that the definition of demolition and the words "any action" in
the statute should be broadly interpreted).
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opinion94 and the legislative history of § 1437p(d).95 In Homer, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) had vio-
lated § 1437p by failing to maintain the Homer project.96 In a second
proceeding two years later, the same court denied a summary judgment
motion, deciding that while it recognized a cause of action under § 1437 p
for de facto demolition,97 the uncertainty of the elements and standard of
proof needed for the action warranted a trial.98
Confirming the holding in Homer,99 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also upheld de facto demolition
as a cause of action in Velez v. Cisneros.10 In Velez, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Chester Housing Authority had failed to fill vacancies, to main-
94. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F. 2d 651, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that no distinction should be made between actual and de facto
demolition).
95. See H.R. CONG. REP. No. 426, supra note 68, at 172, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3469 (declaring that Congress intended that the amendment to § 1437p
should correct the erroneous interpretation in Edwards and create a fully enforceable
cause of action against a PHA for taking any step toward demolition without meeting the
statutory criteria).
96. Homer, 780 F. Supp. at 512-13. Many of the problems in the Homer project are
common to other Chicago housing projects. See Flynn McRoberts, CHA Spending
Choices: Safety or Maintenance, CHIi. TRIB., June 12, 1994, § 2, at 1 (reporting that the
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago filed suit against the CHA based partially on the
CHA's alleged failure to maintain a housing project). On June 12, 1994, The Chicago
Tribune detailed 713 housing code violations found in the Cabrini-Green development, a
project under the jurisdiction of the CHA. Id. As an example of the deterioration of
Cabrini-Green, one tenant reported that it took two years to replace her boarded-up win-
dows with glass. Id.
97. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818-19 (rejecting the motions for summary judgment by
finding that "a genuine issue of material fact" remained as to whether the units were no
longer habitable and whether defendants' actions caused this de facto demolition). While
the plaintiffs had introduced evidence showing high vacancy rates, the court felt that this
evidence alone was not sufficient to rule on the issue of inhabitability. Id. at 818. The
judge also questioned whether the cited code violations translated into demolished prop-
erty, how Horner compared to other Chicago projects, and whether the conditions had
improved since the parties' briefs had been submitted. Id.
98. Id. at 817-18; see supra note 97 (describing the judge's concerns that the case
should not be decided on summary judgment); see also Flynn McRoberts, CHA Proposes
Its Biggest Rehab; $200 Million Homer Plan Aims To End Suit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1994,
§ 2, at 1 (reporting on plaintiffs' efforts to take the Homer case to trial). As the case
approached a trial date of December 15, 1994, it appeared that the CHA sought a settle-
ment with the plaintiffs, who were represented by the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chi-
cago. Id. In the fall of 1994, the CHA proposed spending $200 million on rehabilitation
of the Henry Horner project. Id. Yet, the Legal Assistance Foundation indicated that it
would only view this proposal as a serious compromise if it were backed by federal funds.
Legal Assistance Foundation Interview, supra note 28.
99. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 817 (recognizing de facto demolition as a cause of action).
100. 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that, in the absence of satisfying
§ 1437p(a) and (b), de facto demolition was a violation of § 1437p(d)).
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tain units at a decent standard, to respond to complaints, and to perform
necessary inspections. 101 The court reasoned that if the statute is silent or
unclear, the court may apply the agency's interpretation provided it is a
"permissible construction of the statute.' 1 2 The court found, however,
that HUD's interpretation failed to fall within the range of permissible
interpretations. 10 3 In upholding the claim, the Velez court stated that
HUD's narrow definition of demolition not only allows a PHA to violate
§ 1437p by vacating units and permitting them to deteriorate through pas-
sivity and neglect,'10 4 but also violates Congress's intent in enacting the
amendment.10 5
B. Judicial Adoption and Rejection of an Intent Requirement
Although the issues of whether an action for demolition should include
a claim of de facto demolition and whether plaintiffs need to prove a
PHA's intent to demolish tend to occur in similar factual contexts, they
are two distinct questions.0 6 Following Edwards, °7 a consensus
emerged among the courts that a cause of action for de facto demolition
exists. 10 8 But courts struggled to agree about the need for plaintiffs to
101. Id. at 1260.
102. Id. at 1270 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). The Chevron standard permits deference to an agency's in-
terpretation if the statute is silent or unclear and the agency's reading is a "permissible
construction of the statute." Id. (citing Chevron).
103. Id. at 1271.
104. Id. (determining that housing units may become uninhabitable for reasons other
than razing). The court drew a parallel between a PHA's razing a building to make room
for replacement housing, and allowing the interior of a building to deteriorate so that
tenants have to be displaced in order to modernize and rehabilitate. Id. The former situa-
tion would trigger the requirements under § 1437p(a) and (b) while the latter situation
would not trigger the statutory requirements. Id. The court then concluded that the dis-
tinction between actual, razing demolition and passive, de facto demolition was "arbi-
trary." Id.
105. Id. at 1270 (deducing that Congress's intent in enacting § 1437p(d) was to preserve
the number of available housing units). Since the HUD definition would allow units to
deteriorate without meeting the statutory requirements, the court found that HUD's defi-
nition "conflicts with the clear purpose of § 1437p." Id. at 1271.
106. E.g., Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 818
(N.D. IU. 1993) (distinguishing a violation of § 1437p(d) based on de facto demolition from
the issue of intent and holding that while intent would be a factor in determining whether
de facto demolition has occurred, it would not be dispositive).
107. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to
recognize a cause of action for de facto demolition); see supra notes 62-66 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the reasoning and holding in Edwards).
108. See supra note 21 (noting examples of cases following Edwards which held that de
facto demolition constituted a cause of action under § 1437p).
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satisfy the intent requirement.10 9 Federal courts addressed the issue of
intent for the first time in 1992.110
In Gomez v. Housing Authority,"' the El Paso Housing Authority
(EPHA) stated that it had left units vacant pending HUD's approval of
EPHA's demolition application. 1 2 In response, the plaintiffs asserted
that while the EPHA waited for approval of its demolition application, it
removed the vacant units from the rent rolls, possibly triggering further
deterioration." 3 The plaintiffs further argued that by neglecting the
maintenance of these numerous vacant units, the EPHA had engaged in
de facto demolition and therefore had violated § 1437p."
4
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas was
the first court to hold that tenants had to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the PHA had a policy or intention of allowing the units
to remain vacant or deteriorate for a substantial period of time, resulting
in de facto demolition." 5 In denying the plaintiffs' claim, the court rea-
soned that vacancies due to pending demolition or tenant complaints"
6
constituted evidence that the PHA did not have a policy to allow the
units to become uninhabitable." 7 Thus, simple neglect that caused the
109. See Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273 n.7 (stating that, while in this case the plaintiffs
adequately proved defendants' intent, intent was not a statutorily required element);
Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818 (determining that, whatever the court decided was needed to
prove an action for de facto demolition, proof of the defendant's intent to demolish the
project will not be an element). But see Gomez v. Hous. Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375
(W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (holding that plaintiffs have to prove a policy
of allowing extended vacancies or deterioration on the part of the defendant housing
authority).
110. E.g., Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375 (considering for the first time the PHA's inten-
tions by holding that the plaintiffs had not shown that the PHA had a "policy of allowing
public housing units to deteriorate").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1378. In addition to HUD approval, the EPHA also stated that it had left
units vacant due to modernization under the Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Pro-
gram (CIAP). Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341 (explaining the types of funding CIAP provides and the process of
compliance).
113. Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375 (omitting any discussion of why the foundations were
in disrepair and whether tenants had been consulted prior to construction of the overpass).
114. Id. at 1374-75; see also Flynn McRoberts, CHA Attempts A Delicate Balancing
Act, Cmi. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1994, § 2, at 1 (reporting on the criticism for putting funds toward
fixing up units slated for demolition while an application was pending at HUD).
115. Gomez, 850 F. Supp. at 1375 (finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that
the EPHA had either purposefully allowed the units to become deteriorated or had will-
fully disregarded HUD requirements).
116. Id. at 1376 (finding that tenants had complained about a newly constructed high-
way overpass).
117. Id. at 1375. The court reasoned that the EPHA applied for demolition of eighteen
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dilapidation would not constitute an actionable violation of § 1437p un-
less the PHA intended for this dilapidation to occur.118
The federal district court in Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago
Housing Authority" 9 found the Gomez requirement that the plaintiff
must show a PHA policy of allowing units to become uninhabitable as
"tantamount" to a required showing of intent.' ° In Homer, the plaintiffs
contended that the Chicago Housing Association (CHA) violated
§ 1437p by evading local statutory requirements and allowing the project
to deteriorate through neglect and inaction.12 However, unlike Gomez,
the defendant had not applied for HUD approval to demolish.'
units of the Kathy White and Salazar housing projects because the units' foundations had
deteriorated and due to tenant complaints concerning the newly built overpass. Id. The
court ruled that, because plaintiffs had not questioned the need for the demolition or the
EPHA's compliance with statutory requirements and because the EPHA had bought re-
placement housing, there was no showing of a policy or intent by the EPHA to allow for de
facto demolition. Id.
118. Id. at 1378.
119. Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
120. Id. at 817 n.8 (rejecting the Gomez interpretation); see Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at
1378 (holding that proof of intent was a critical element in an action for de facto
demolition).
121. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818. The facts in the case bear witness to plaintiffs' allega-
tions. From 1981 to 1991 vacancy rates rose from 2.3% to 49.3%, while the vacancy rate
for nine other CHA projects was 17.3%. Id. at 810. In a 1990 plan to decrease vacancies
submitted by the CHA to HUD's regional administrator, Homer was not included as a
targeted project; yet, while it was included in a 1991 plan, only thirty-three of the projected
349 units were successfully repaired and "brought on line." Id. at 811. In addition to
vacancies, the CHA admitted in a report to HUD that Homer was its most "troubled
development." Id. at 812. After the complaint was filed, City of Chicago inspectors cited
570 code violations. Id.
Following these inspections, HUD conducted its own inspection and found that only
1.3% of the units complied with HUD Housing Quality Standards. Id. at 813. In 1989, the
CHA requested $48 million in funding under the Comprehensive Improvement Assistance
Program (CIAP), which was replaced by the Comprehensive Grant Program in 1992, 1%
of which was spent on the Homer project. Id. In 1990, the CHA requested $81 million of
which 8% was slated for Homer. Id. Between 1983 and 1991 while Homer vacancy rates
were higher than any of the other CHA developments, less CIAP funds were spent at
Homer than at any of the other developments. Id. at 814. In a letter to the CHA in
August of 1992, the HUD regional administrator wrote that the fact that Homer did not
appear to be receiving its fair share of HUD funds made it difficult to believe that the
CHA was committed to improving conditions at the project. Id. at 815.
122. Id. at 817. The plaintiffs in the Homer case did not allege that the CHA applied to
HUD for demolition approval without meeting the statutory requirements of § 1437p(a)
and (b). Id. Instead, they alleged that the CHA had violated § 1437p(d) as well as (a) and
(b) by failing to maintain and repair the Homer project. Id. Through these inactions, the




The court agreed that § 1437p controls any action that destroys a pro-
ject, whether active or passive.123 Addressing the issue of intent, the
court disagreed with the Gomez decision'2 4 and emphatically rejected the
necessity of proving the CHA's intent to demolish the Homer housing
project. 125 The court held that if the PHA had failed to meet the statu-
tory requirements and the public housing had been demolished, whether
through "design, neglect, incompetence or inadvertence," then the PHA
had violated § 1437p(d).126 The Homer court further held that the legis-
lative history and statutory language evidenced a congressional intent to
allow a plaintiff to bring an action for demolition without a showing of
intent and regardless of whether the PHA had applied for approval to
demolish.' 27 Consequently, the court found that HUD's duty to enforce
the statute begins when a PHA takes action to demolish, whether that
action be affirmative or passive neglect. 28
In Velez v. Cisneros,'29 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania followed the Homer court, holding that the
plaintiffs were not required to prove that the housing authority had a plan
or intent to demolish the project. 130 Relying on the statutory language of
123. Id. at 818. The court was not prepared to rule on what constituted an action for de
facto demolition and what the plaintiffs would have to prove to sustain such an action. Id.
at 817. The plaintiffs proposed criteria that they believed would justify a finding of de facto
demolition. Id. These criteria included a showing that defendants engaged in conduct
likely to produce either affirmative or passive demolition; a showing that the defendants
engaged in de facto demolition effecting some or all of the project; and a showing of a high
vacancy percentage. Id. The court, however, declined to adopt this proposal and deter-
mined that its ruling would have to be based on a trial. Id. at 818.
124. Id. at 818 n.8.
125. Id. at 818.
126. Id. The court, in presenting its opinion, referred to its earlier decision in Henry
Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. I11. 1991). In
Homer, the court dismissed defendants' prior motion and held that action or inaction that
destroys a project and renders the units uninhabitable is controlled by § 1437p(d). Id. at
513-15.
127. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818-19. Contra Post-Trial Brief of Defendant, CHA, at 13,
Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 90-6449) [hereinafter Brief for
Defendant, Chester HA] (questioning the logic of the Homer court's reasoning that, even
if intent is not an element, it remains a factor in the court's determination of de facto
demolition).
128. Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 818.
129. Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
130. Id. at 1273 n. 7 (following Homer and rejecting the intent provision). Tenants of
the Chester Housing Authority (Chester HA) filed suit against HUD and Chester HA for
gross mismanagement and neglect that resulted in de facto demolition, in violation of
§ 1437p. Id. at 1260. The opinion detailed the deteriorated physical condition of many of
the Chester HA projects. Id. For example, one project was so dilapidated that the HUD
regional administrator refused to walk through the project out of concern for his safety.
Id. at 1261-62. He cited unsecured units with wide-open and broken windows on the sec-
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§ 1437p, the court determined that the purpose of the section was to pre-
vent the reduction of available housing units. 13 1 The court then con-
cluded that it is irrelevant whether a PHA intentionally removes units
from use or whether they become unusable due to a PHA's unintentional
neglect.
132
The Velez court found that the defendant, Chester Housing Authority
(Chester HA), through its policy of removing units from the rent rolls
when they become vacant, had reduced the number of housing units
available without preparing a plan for replacement. 33 The court held
that the combination of the high number of vacancies, the plan not to
make interim repairs of vacant units awaiting modernization, and the sub-
stantial amount of time that units would be vacant during modernization
constituted de facto demolition. 3 1 While the court determined that in-
tent was not a requirement of the plaintiff's case, nevertheless, the court
found intent through the Chester HA's negligence. 135 The court looked
not to whether there was specific intent to demolish, but whether there
was intent to act,'1 36 that then resulted in de facto demolition.1
37
ond and third floors and trash scattered throughout the building. Id. at 1262. Further-
more, there was no evidence of maintenance or efforts to halt the deterioration, as the
maintenance staff had been hired through a system of patronage and Chester HA's finan-
cial health was rapidly deteriorating. Id. at 1263.
131. Id. at 1270.
132. Id. at 1271. This holding is consistent with the dissenting opinion in Edwards v.
District of Columbia, which determined that the key issue in demolition is the result, not
how the action was carried out. 821 F.2d. 651, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting).
133. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273. The court found that the Chester HA had a policy of
not re-renting units once they became vacant. Id. This policy was based on the Chester
HA's belief that it was futile and wasteful to make temporary repairs to re-rent the units
while awaiting complete rehabilitation. Id. Yet, the court concluded that rehabilitation of
these units would take years, and in the interim, a large number of units would be unavaila-
ble. Id.
134. Id. at 1278.
135. Id. at 1273 n.7; see also Telephone Interview with Attorney at Drinker, Biddle &
Reath, Phila., Pa. and counsel for plaintiffs in Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter Attorney Interview].
136. Attorney Interview, supra note 135 (explaining that the court looked only at
whether there was an intent to act).
137. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1278.
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II. HUD's WITHDRAWN RULE OF INTENT: THE AGENCY'S
STATUTORY READING AND MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
A. HUD's Final Rule Interpreting § 18(d) of the 1987 Housing and
Community Development Act
In November of 1993, HUD proposed a final rule to implement
§ 1437p(d)' 3 s and replace the interim rule, which was promulgated in Au-
gust of 1988.139 While public comments had been requested for the in-
terim rule, the rule made no mention of an intent provision or that HUD
intended to exclude de facto demolition as a cause of action. 140 HUD
sought no public comments while promulgating the final rule.14'
1. HUD's Definition of Demolition
In a footnote to the final rule, HUD defined demolition as razing, and
specifically excluded de facto demolition. 142 By excluding de facto demo-
lition, HUD allowed actions or inactions that constituted deterioration,
such as negligence, lack of maintenance, and extended vacancies to occur
without resulting in a violation of § 1437p.143 In addition, HUD argued
that nowhere in the statute or its legislative history did Congress indicate
a desire to police PHAs' failed maintenance efforts unless they are done
with the intent of razing.
144
138. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24.
139. Public Housing Program; Demolition or Disposition of Public Housing Projects, 53
Fed. Reg. 30,984 (1988) (interim rule) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 970).
140. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4-5; see infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text
(discussing this procedural process).
141. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4-5.
142. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784 n.3 (clarifying that deterioration
does not qualify as demolition under the meaning of this statute). Therefore, HUD con-
cluded that because demolition only occurs when a building is razed, any action short of
razing, meaning de facto demolition, was not covered under the statute. Id.
143. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that, under the majority's approach, PHAs could demolish the
projects by allowing vandalism and a lack of necessary, routine maintenance to render the
projects uninhabitable without triggering the statutory requirements set out in § 1437p(b)).
144. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785. See also infra notes 176-80 and
accompanying text (discussing HUD's argument that there is a nexus between the words
"action" and "demolish" in the statute); infra text accompanying notes 198-200 (explaining
HUD's belief that Congress was aware of HUD's razing definition when it enacted
§ 1437p(d) and that Congress could have altered the definition in the statute if it disagreed
with HUD's definition); and infra text accompanying notes 157-59 (detailing HUD's argu-
ment that provisions to maintain the project are spelled out under the ACC and to inter-
pret § 1437p(d) to encompass those same provisions would be repetitive).
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In Velez v. Cisneros,45 the court concluded that HUD's narrow defini-
tion of demolition was contrary to congressional intent, 46 based on its
determination that the clear purpose of the 1987 amendment was to
maintain the number of available housing units. 147 The legislative history
of the amendment described the purpose as adding to the number of
available units." By allowing de facto demolition to occur, HUD's rule
permitted PHAs to vacate and decrease the number of available units.
The Velez court found that this result directly contradicted the statutory
intent.
149
2. De Facto Demolition: Consideration as to Whether It Should Be
Included in the Definition of Demolition
The court in Velez v. Cisneros held that HUD's definition was "arbi-
trary" because the same result occurred whether the exterior walls were
demolished by razing or the interior walls were demolished by lack of
maintenance-the number of habitable units decreased. 150 Courts also
145. 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
146. Id. at 1273 n.7 (holding that, by allowing units to be removed from the rent rolls,
whether through neglect or direct demolition, the PHA was still reducing the number of
available housing units and, therefore, violating congressional intent)
147. Id.
148. H.R. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341
(citing the "desperate need for affordable housing for lower income families"). The House
Committee stated that the purpose of the 1987 amendment, which added the one-for-one
replacement rule back into the statute after it had been removed in 1986 and added
§ 18(d), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d), was to increase the total number of units offered
to low-income, eligible tenants. Id. at 25-26, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341-42.
Between 1973 and 1983, 4.5 million units were removed from the rent rolls due to demo-
lition or "structural conversions" and roughly half were low-income residences. THE NA-
TIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE To LIvE 6 (Mar. 1988) (discussing the
shrinking number of affordable housing units). In 1980, the number of low-income people,
those earning $10,000 or less and seeking affordable housing, with rent payments of $250 or
less, surpassed the supply of affordable housing. Id.; see also STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING, supra note 5, at 32 (explaining that from 1985 to 1991, 69,000 units of low-cost
housing, defined as subsidized rental units with monthly rents equal to $300 in 1989 dol-
lars, were lost in the Northeast). Additionally, 83,000 of the same type of units were lost in
urban areas (including the Northeast). Id.
149. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273 (examining the policies of the Chester Housing Author-
ity and determining that the PHA's practice of either unintentionally allowing units to
deteriorate or intentionally removing units from the rent rolls violated Congress's intent to
preserve the number of available housing units).
150. Id. at 1271. Evidence of deterioration that leaves units uninhabitable is not unu-
sual in many of the housing projects across the country. See, e.g., Mary Francis, Housing
Residents Planning Better Lives, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 4, 1994, at C1 (describing the
prevalence of drugs in the Eagle Creek Village housing project which has forced residents
to remain inside behind bolted doors); Gutierrez, supra note 4, at 5A (documenting over-
crowded conditions and dilapidated units with broken heating and air-conditioning sys-
tems); Ihejirika, Wrecking Ball Claims 4 S. Side CHA Buildings, supra note 4, at 6
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have argued that § 1437p itself does not distinguish between de facto
demolition and actual demolition and, therefore, both actions ought to be
prohibited because they would lead to the same result.15'
In contrast, the court in Dessin v. Housing Authority5 2 reasoned that if
Congress had intended to allow tenants to bring suit against a PHA for a
failure to maintain the units, Congress would have stated so in unambig-
uous language." 3 Although the Dessin decision is not precedent, 5 4 it is
instructive to review its findings. The Dessin court held that HUD's defi-
nition of razing should be given considerable weight and that the court
should reject the definition only if it is contrary to "clearly expressed
legislative intention."' 5  The court concluded that the agency and
(reporting on the demolition of buildings that had become so dilapidated that rotten stairs
were collapsing and rats and roaches were rampant).
By concluding that there was no resultant difference if the structure was razed by bull-
dozers or slowly deteriorated due to lack of maintenance and care, the Velez court fol-
lowed the dissent in Edwards. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1271. The Edwards dissent argued
that, because Congress was trying to prohibit a result from occurring, Congress was not
concerned with how this result occurred. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651,
670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Therefore, the statute should
prevent any process that resulted in demolition of the housing units which did not meet the
statutory requirements. Id.
151. See Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817
(N.D. I11. 1993) (holding that de facto demolition constitutes a legitimate cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d)); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.
Conn. 1988) (ruling that the words "any action" include conduct such as negligence, inac-
tion or neglect that would render the units uninhabitable).
152. Dessin v. Housing Auth., 783 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd in part and
vacated in part, 948 F.2d 730 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (mem.) (holding that de facto
demolition does not constitute a cause of action).
153. Id. at 590 (maintaining that HUD's definition of razing should be adopted).
154. See supra note 89 (discussing the vacated decision in Dessin).
155. Dessin, 783 F. Supp. at 590 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300
(1983)). The Dessin court relied on the Supreme Court's methodology for statutory inter-
pretation developed in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council which laid
out a two part test. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The first prong of the statutory interpretation
test was to determine whether Congress had clearly spoken and whether the intent of Con-
gress was clear. Id. If so, the court and the agency must adopt this interpretation. Id. at
842-43. However, if the statute is unclear, the court must defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion if it is a "permissible construction of the statute." ld. at 843.
The Dessin court believed that the statutory language was facially clear and meant raz-
ing. Dessin, 783 F. Supp. at 590. Yet the court also made the alternative argument stating
that even if the term was not facially clear, step two of the Chevron test applied and the
agency's interpretation should be given substantial weight. Id. HUD interpreted "demoli-
tion" as razing and the Dessin court held that this was a permissible construction of the
statute. Id.
The Velez court, however, argued that only the second part of the Chevron test applied.
Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Determining that the statute
was ambiguous, the court looked at congressional intent, which was to preserve the
number of available units of public housing, and reasoned that HUD's definition did not
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dictionary definitions were consistent in meaning active demolition
only.
15 6
HUD's argument for excluding constructive or de facto demolition is
that, under the ACC, PHAs are required to keep units in a "decent, safe
and sanitary manner," and inclusion of these maintenance requirements
under § 1437p(d) would be redundant.'57 In Velez, the defendant, the
Chester Housing Authority (Chester HA), expanded upon this argu-
ment.158 The Chester HA argued that the statutory language did not dis-
cuss PHA neglect or inaction and that, therefore, there was no reason to
include these circumstances under the statute as their inclusion would
render the regulations under the ACC superfluous.
l5 9
HUD's argument in favor of excluding de facto demolition as a cause
of action based on redundancy is a strong one. Yet, the statute explicitly
duplicates language when discussing additional areas of the demolition
issue. 16  For example, under the ACC, § 1437c(j)(1)(C)(i) requires that
the housing authority replace one-for-one units that are demolished or
disposed.' 6 ' This requirement for HUD approval of demolition also is
included in § 1437p(b). 162 The prevalence of such "redundant" language
in the statute weakens HUD's argument.
163
Another response to the ACC argument lies in the legislative history
and the intent of the 1987 amendment."6 By refusing to incorporate into
comport with the statutory intent. Id. at 1270-71. The Velez court, therefore, rejected
HUD's interpretation and included de facto demolition in its definition of demolition. Id.
156. Dessin, 783 F. Supp. at 590 (interpreting both the dictionary and agency meaning
of demolish as "'to pull or tear down [, to] raze' ").
157. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785. Commenting on the rule, HUD
stated that it would be "superfluous and illogical" to assume that Congress intended to
replicate existing requirements specified in the ACC. Id
158. Brief for Defendant, Chester HA, supra note 127, at 8.
159. Id. Chester HA argued that if § 1437p(d) allowed tenants to bring suit in federal
court for violations of maintenance duties and repairs, the statute would needlessly mirror
the ACC. Id. But see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (explaining the court's
decision in Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1276-77, not to allow tenants to bring suit under the
ACC).
160. See infra notes 161-62 (illustrating the identical language in the ACC and
§ 1437p(b) with regards to the one-for-one replacement rule).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(j)(1)(C)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (stating that a PHA will
replace units that are sold, demolished, or lost through redesign by the PHA).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(3) (requiring that the PHA provide an additional "decent,
safe, sanitary, and affordable dwelling unit" for each unit that is demolished or disposed).
163. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no cause of
action for lack of maintenance and deteriorated conditions under the ACC, which leaves a
suit for de facto demolition under § 1437p(d) as a tenant's only cause of legal action).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3342 (explaining that the House Committee specifically stated that its goal was to add to
the number of available housing units).
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the words "any action" the activities of neglect, passivity or simple inac-
tion, courts have argued that defendants are ignoring the very reason the
amendment was enacted: to preserve the supply of housing units.'6 5
These arguments have followed the dissent's reasoning in Edwards v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 66 which found that the resulting demolition to a public
housing project is the same, whether by bulldozer or inaction. 67 Con-
gressional intent clearly favors preserving available housing units. 68
Therefore, interpreting the statutory language to mirror that of the ACC,
while perhaps repetitive, ensures that PHAs will follow the statutory
intent.
Yet, while the requirements of § 1437p(d) may duplicate the ACC re-
quirements, only § 1437p allows tenants to bring a cause of action for
violation of these requirements. 169 Therefore, without § 1437p(d), ten-
165. E.g., Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that
limiting the requirements of the statute to actual demolition would undermine congres-
sional intent, which was to allow tenants to enforce the "physical condition requirements"
of § 1437 p); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Conn. 1988)
(concluding that demolition of housing units, whether through actual or de facto demoli-
tion, violated the congressional intent of preserving the number of available housing units).
166. 821 F.2d 651, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting) (finding a cause of action
for de facto demolition).
167. Id. The dissent viewed the congressional intent as favoring the preservation of
housing. Id. at 669. It therefore concluded that because the statutory goal was to maintain
the number of units available to low-income tenants, the method of destruction was irrele-
vant. Id. at 670. Consequently, the dissent held that de facto demolition should be subject
to the requirements of § 1437p. Id.
168. See supra notes 164-67 (analyzing the congressional intent of § 1437p(d)); see also
PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 76 (criticizing some of HUD's actions just
before the 1987 amendments were passed as contrary to the congressional intent of pre-
serving "the public housing stock").
169. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 426, supra note 68, at 172, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3469 (indicating that the language of § 1437p(d) which prohibited taking
any action toward demolition would be "fully enforceable" by residents or applicants); cf
Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing § 510(B) of the ACC,
which explains that only bond holders and the PHA may be classified as third party benefi-
ciaries-the only groups who may bring a cause of action under the ACC). Therefore,
residents may not bring suit alleging violations under the ACC. Id.; accord Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel Interview, supra note 32 (confirming that HUD does not recognize tenant
suits for maintenance violations under the ACC). But see Henry Homer Mothers Guild v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1991), summ. judgment denied, 824 F.
Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (dismissing defendants' motion claiming tenants could not bring
a cause of action under the ACC as they were not third party beneficiaries); Concerned
Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 323 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding that tenants should
be considered third party beneficiaries and should have an enforceable right against a
PHA to comply with the ACC). The lower federal courts remain divided over the defini-
tion of eligible third party beneficiaries. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1277 n.14.
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ants would have no recourse against PHAs that failed to maintain and
consequently demolished their buildings.
170
HUD's final argument in the proposed rule is that reading § 1437p(d)
to encompass actions for de facto demolition would nullify § 1437p(a). 17'
This section provides that HUD should not grant an application for ap-
proval unless the project is obsolete and uninhabitable. 72 If de facto
demolition is prohibited under this statute, HUD argues, then the circum-
stances outlined in § 1437p(a) will never occur.1 7 3 This reasoning is
flawed because § 1437p(a) describes circumstances where the project is
obsolete due to "physical condition, location, or other factors.' 7 4 There
will be circumstances that fall under these categories that are not a result
of a PHA's action or inaction.
175
3. HUD's Interpretation of an Intent Provision
HUD reads the language of § 1437p(d) prohibiting "any action to de-
molish"' to imply a plan to demolish with a "nexus" between the words
action and demolish. 177 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary de-
170. See supra note 169 (discussing the eligibility of residents to sue as third party bene-
ficiaries). If decisions as to who may bring a cause of action under the ACC continue to
follow the Velez court's ruling, § 1437p(d) will be the only method by which tenants may
enforce the maintenance requirements.
171. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785 (arguing that § 1437p(a) does not
become relevant until the housing project is obsolete, unusable for housing purposes and
that no amount of rehabilitation will remedy the problems). By allowing § 1437p(d) to
include de facto demolition, HUD reasoned that buildings would not reach the state at
which § 1437p(a) is relevant. Id. Therefore, this interpretation of § 1437p(d) would nullify
§ 1437p(a). Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
173. See Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785. Yet, HUD failed to acknowl-
edge the congressional intent of preserving and maintaining current housing stock. Id.; see
supra note 70 (explaining that Congress wanted to preserve and add to the number of
housing units available and allow tenants the means to prevent the unnecessary demoli-
tion of the units). Therefore, if § 1437p(d) were to eliminate the need for § 1437p(a) by
preventing de facto demolition, then arguably it would further congressional intent. But
see infra note 175 and accompanying text (noting that § 1437p(a) covers instances other
than de facto demolition).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(1); see supra note 14 (quoting § 1437p(a)(1)).
175. E.g., Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd
without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (revealing that the PHA's application for demolition was based on
tenants' complaints about a recently built highway overpass that forced the PHA to vacate
the units).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992). The language of the provision
states that "[a] public housing agency shall not take any action to demolish or dispose of a
public housing project or a portion of a public housing project without obtaining the ap-
proval of the Secretary and satisfying the conditions specified in subsections (a) and (b) of
this section." Id.
177. Brief for Defendant, HUD, supra note 37, at 20.
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fines "plan" as "a method for achieving an end" and involves a mental
element. 178 HUD has asserted that the "plan" is a plan to demolish and
thus, the mental element of intent applies strictly to demolition.
179
Therefore, according to HUD, § 1437p(d) does not apply when a PHA
vacates units with the intent to renovate.'8 Since not all PHAs will an-
nounce their intention to demolish by submitting an application to HUD,
plaintiffs will be forced to prove intent by the totality of the circum-
stances and to prove that demolition was a motivating factor behind a
PHA's actions or negligence.' 8
HUD reasoned that a PHA's failure to maintain the units alone would
not trigger a violation of the statute.' 82 It based this conclusion, in part,
on Congress's stated intention in enacting § 1437p(d), which was to cor-
rect the erroneous decision announced in Edwards.' 3 In Edwards, the
PHA had submitted an application for demolition.1" Since the de facto
demolition occurred while an application for demolition was awaiting ap-
proval, HUD read the 1987 amendment to pertain only to violations oc-




179. Id. (offering an example of a PHA purposefully leaving units vacant with the
knowledge that they are slated to be modernized, and reasoning that this is not a "plan"
that has the intent of demolition). See also Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at 1375. In Gomez, the
defendant PHA acknowledged that it purposefully left units vacant because they were to
be demolished. Id. The PHA argued that it did not allow the vacancies to occur with the
intent of having the units fall into a state of disrepair and therefore warrant vacancy, but
rather the units were left vacant after demolition had been approved. Id.
180. Brief for Defendant, HUD, supra note 37, at 20; see also Gomez, 805 F. Supp. at
1375 (holding that there was no violation of the statute because the actions were not taken
as part of a plan to further the de facto demolition).
181. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,785 (specifying HUD's interpretation
of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a cause of action under § 1437p(d)). For a discussion
of what elements might be needed to prove an action for de facto demolition, see supra
note 123.
182. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784.
183. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 426, supra note 68, at 172, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3469 (stating that the Edwards decision prompted the enactment of § 1437p(d)).
184. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Edwards,
the PHA submitted an application to HUD initially to demolish 28, but ultimately 112,
units in the Fort Dupont housing project. Id. See also supra notes 62-66 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Edwards case in more detail).
185. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784-85 (concluding that, because the
PHA was waiting for demolition approval, the PHA was acting with the intent of demoli-
tion by allowing vacancies to occur). HUD further stated that a PHA's failure to repair or
maintain units, without being linked to an application for demolition, would not be action-
able under the statute because such action would lack the necessary intent to demolish. Id.
at 58,784. But see Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992),
aff'd without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
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Counsel for the Chester Housing Authority (Chester HA), as co-de-
fendant with HUD in Velez v. Cisneros, supported HUD's interpretation
of an intent requirement by relying on the Edwards dissent. 186 Since
Congress specifically noted that § 1437p(d) was written to correct the
statutory misinterpretation in Edwards,187 reliance on the Edwards opin-
ions is particularly relevant. In discarding the majority's interpretation
that denied a cause of action, Congress seemed to be embracing the Ed-
wards dissent's position.'
88
The Chester HA, meanwhile, asserted that the Edwards dissent's opin-
ion, using words that connote a plan or scheme to explain de facto demo-
lition, gave credence to HUD's intent requirement. 189 As further support
of an intent requirement, the Edwards dissent argued that, at trial, the
plaintiffs would have difficulty proving a "deliberate scheme to evade
federal law."' 190 By using these words, the dissent seemed to incorporate
the necessity of proving a conscious strategy in an action for de facto
demolition.'
91
denied, 115 S.Ct. 198 (1994) (explaining that the court sought by a preponderance of the
evidence that the PHA had a policy of allowing extended vacancies or deterioration be-
yond the fact that the EPHA had applied for demolition); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 111-18 (explaining the Gomez court's rationale that absent an intent to demolish,
the PHA's actions in neglecting the housing units and allowing the units to stand vacant
while an application for demolition was pending did not constitute de facto demolition).
186. Brief for Defendant, Chester HA, supra note 127, at 11. It is interesting to note
that both the defendants and the plaintiffs in this case relied on the Edwards dissent to
bolster their case. See infra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining the defendants'
use of the Edwards dissent's exact language); supra note 150 and accompanying text (not-
ing the plaintiffs' reliance on the dissenting opinion in Edwards).
187. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 426, supra note 68, at 172, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3469 (specifically stating that § 1437p(d) was "intended to correct... [the Edwards court's]
erroneous interpretation").
188. See also Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Conn. 1988)
(holding that the Edwards dissent provided a more convincing interpretation of the rights
available under § 1437p).
189. See Brief for Defendant, Chester HA, supra note 127, at 11; see also Edwards, 821
F.2d at 669-70 (Will, J., dissenting). Judge Will stated that "'[die facto demolition,' as the
plaintiffs use it, is simply a shorthand form denoting the deliberate abandonment of public
housing units to render them uninhabitable and therefore subject to demolition." Id. at
669. The judge continued, "§ 1437p requires a PHA to obtain HUD approval before it
may engage in a concerted course of conduct designed to destroy public housing units
whether by actual demolition or by rendering them uninhabitable." Id. at 670. Conse-
quently, HUD and Chester HA interpreted this language to require proof of an intent to
demolish before neglect and abandonment could cause a violation under § 1437p(d). See
Brief for Defendant, Chester HA, supra note 127, at 11.
190. Edwards, 821 F.2d at 671 (Will, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over the diffi-





The question in Edwards, however, was whether to provide a cause of
action for de facto demolition under § 1437p, 192 rather than how to de-
fine the specific elements of that cause of action.193 The dissent looked to
a Senate Report to support its findings that no distinction should be made
between actual and de facto demolition.' 94 Furthermore, the dissent de-
termined that at the crux of § 1437p there was a preference to preserve
existing housing units however possible.195
While HUD and Chester HA, defendants in the Velez case, focused on
some specific words in the Edwards dissent to make a case for intent, the
dissent emphasized the more fundamental argument of allowing de facto
demolition to be included as a cause of action. The Edwards dissent's
language of a scheme may be shown to favor an intent requirement,
however, the opinion pointed to the need to permit a cause of action to
prevent the results of de facto demolition, 96 which an intent provision
might inhibit. 97
HUD also has argued that if Congress wanted to allow an action for
failure to properly maintain the units, it could have done so in the 1987
amendment, as Congress was familiar with HUD's razing definition.' 9
However, in HUD's proposed rule, HUD added language stating that a
PHA may not take any action intended to further demolition. 99 Con-
gress also could have added the word intended, but instead, left the lan-
guage open to cover "any action" that would result in the deterioration of
housing units.2 °°
192. Id. at 665 (Will, J., dissenting) (determining that the only issue was whether the
plaintiffs' allegations established a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1437p).
193. See Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (deciding that on the motion for summary judgment, the court declined to
articulate a standard of proof or the necessary elements in a de facto demolition suit, pre-
ferring to let that issue be resolved at trial).
194. Edwards, 821 F.2d at 669 (Will, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (citing S. REP., No. 142, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1768, 1809, which stated that the goal of § 1437p(d) was to preserve and
maintain available housing).
196. See Edwards, 821 F.2d. at 670 (Will, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 670-71 (Will, J., dissenting). While the dissent advocated the inclusion of
de facto demolition in the definition of demolition, thereby allowing a tenant cause of
action for de facto demolition, it also acknowledged that it would be very difficult for
plaintiffs to prove that a PHA intended to evade the statutory requirements by engaging in
de facto demolition. Id.
198. Brief for Defendant, HUD, supra note 37, at 24-25. For the language of HUD's
regulation defining demolition as razing, see 24 C.F.R. § 970.3 (1994).
199. Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784-85 (emphasis added).
200. See supra note 18 (quoting the language of § 1437p(d)).
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B. Tenant Groups' Opposition to the Rule
Following HUD's proposed rule, tenant reaction, and subsequent with-
drawal of the rule, HUD convened a meeting of interested tenant groups
and housing authority representatives to discuss the drafting of a final
rule.201 Arguing against the proposed rule, tenant groups contended that
the congressional intent of the words "any action" included a broad range
of actions.20 2 They supported this interpretation by focusing on the dis-
sent's view in Edwards,2 °3 arguing that Congress, in prohibiting a certain
result, failed to specify a method of implementation. 2 4 Rather, the Na-
tional Housing Law Project (NHLP) agreed with the Edwards dissent's
view that unauthorized demolition constitutes a statutory violation,
whether by bulldozing or abandonment and neglect.
20 5
The NHLP further asserted that, in light of the Edwards dissent's inter-
pretation of the scope of the statute, courts should focus on the result of
defendants' actions rather than plaintiffs' ability to establish intent.20 6
The NHLP explained that a test that ignores the results of defendants'
actions and focuses only on intent, would foster further deterioration of
public housing.20 7 A test that delays enforcement until the PHA applies
to HUD for demolition approval results in a development that is often
irreparably deteriorated, leaving demolition as the only option.20 8 There-
fore, the intent provision is contrary to the goals of the statute because
this delay permits the deterioration of a housing development to continue
201. Letter from Joseph Shuldiner, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing,
HUD, to Barry Philpott, Co-Chair, NAHRO Modernization Group (Apr. 1994) (on file
with CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Shuldiner Letter]. The letter is a
sample of an invitation to an April 15, 1994 meeting convened and held at HUD. Id. The
meeting followed the withdrawal of the final rule and was intended to solicit recommenda-
tions from housing authorities and groups in order to develop "a proposed rulemaking" for
§ 1437p(d). Id.
202. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 2-3 (citing the dissent's conclusion in Edwards v.
District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting) that Congress
wanted to prohibit the destruction of housing by any method).
203. Edwards, 821 F.2d at 670 (Will, J., dissenting) (reasoning that Congress wanted to
prohibit the destruction of housing units if the PHA had not complied with the statutory
requirements).
204. Id. at 669 (Will, J., dissenting).
205. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 2-3.
206. Id. at 3 (calling this focus "an effects test" and arguing that the focus should be on
the effects of the action and not on the type of action taken).
207. Id. at 3-4.
208. Id.; see Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (alleging that
the PHA's neglect left actual demolition as the only possible remedy); PUBLIC HOUSING IN
PERIL, supra note 1, at 72-73 (calling this type of action "[d]ecision-making after the fact"
because HUD makes the approval decision only after the PHA has already allowed the




before actual demolition approval is granted.20 9 Thus, the intent require-
ment effectively prevents tenants from obtaining injunctive relief as a
prophylactic safeguard against de facto demolition. While tenants could
file suit and attempt to prove a PHA's intent to demolish in the absence
of an application for demolition, this task would be extremely difficult.210
One tenant group organization believes that a more effective way of
enforcing the statute would be to take action before de facto demolition
occurs and renders a building unsalvageable.211 The NHLP argued that
the rule should institute a device whereby tenants can ensure that PHAs
are held accountable for actions leading to deteriorated housing units.212
This group reasoned that HUD officials were unable to provide the over-
sight necessary to prevent PHAs from presiding over deteriorating condi-
tions, either by their action or neglect. 213 The group views tenants, not
HUD officials, as the most effective monitors of enforcement.21 4
The group envisions the use of litigation as the primary § 1437p(d) en-
forcement mechanism against de facto demolition.215 In light of success-
209. See NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 3 (commenting that allowing only intentional
demolitions to be covered under the statute would frustrate the purpose behind the enact-
ment of § 1437p(d)).
210. See Attorney Interview, supra note 135 (explaining that, although the court in
Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1994) found an intent to demolish
through negligence, the plaintiffs would struggle to prove that intent at trial).
211. See Letter from Jon M. Gutzman, Executive Director, Public Housing Agency of
St. Paul, MN, to Sunia Zaterman, Executive Director, Council of Large Public Housing
Authorities (Apr. 12, 1994) (on file with CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW) (advocating
that action be taken at the earliest opportunity to prevent de facto demolition) [hereinafter
Gutzman Letter]. This position represents the tenant groups' argument for early interven-
tion. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4.
212. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4 (advocating a mechanism to enforce PHA
accountability).
213. Id. (indicating that HUD has limited staff assigned to the job of overseeing PHAs
and "historically" has failed to hold PHAs liable for ineffective management and deterio-
rated conditions).
214. See id. (noting the success of "tenant enforcement efforts" in cases of § 1437p(d)
litigation). Tenant involvement in maintenance, management, security, and other services
in public housing projects is not a new idea. See OFFICE OF RESIDENT INITIATIVES, HUD,
RESIDENT MANAGEMENT SUCCESS STORIES... PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR EM-
POWERMENT 4 (Apr. 9, 1993) (including a success story about the Cochran Gardens hous-
ing project in St. Louis, Mo. which began organizing tenants in the early 1970s for roles in
management, janitorial services and catering services) [hereinafter SUCCESS STORIES]; see
also A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE, supra note 148, at 38 (complimenting HUD and PHAs on
improved tenant involvement and urging these groups to continue promoting tenant activ-
ity in recognizing project needs, prioritizing project improvements and establishing tenant
selection criteria).
215. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4 (concluding that litigation has worked in chal-
lenging maintenance violations); see supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing
the uncertainty of bringing suit under the ACC and the necessity of using § 1437p to bring
a cause of action for such problems).
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ful tenant litigation against PHAs in the past, the group reasoned that
HUD regulations should facilitate rather than hinder the effectiveness of
this device.2 16 This argument encourages filing suit against a PHA before
significant deterioration has taken place.21 7 Yet, litigation is more likely
to be successful when conditions are so measurably deteriorated that the
court can make an accurate determination that the PHA has violated the
statute.218 In effect, a successful suit could be brought before an applica-
tion for demolition is submitted, but after a substantial, and perhaps irre-
versible, amount of damage has been done.219 The weakness of this
argument is that HUD, in promulgating the rule, was unwilling to
strengthen a litigation device that has been used against it so often.22
This tenant group also criticized HUD for proposing the rule without
providing an opportunity for public comment.22' It believed that HUD
incorporated its litigation position of requiring proof of intent into its
216. See NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4; see also supra note 43 (discussing the impact
on the Chicago Housing Authority of the Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation's continu-
ing threat of litigation).
217. See Gutzman Letter, supra note 211 (advocating that measures should be taken at
the earliest possible time to prevent de facto demolition before it happens); see PUBLIC
HOUSING IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 73 (commenting that before the 1987 amendment and
even in 1988 there was no formal way for HUD to step in and counter PHA actions which
caused a project to deteriorate).
218. See Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1274-75 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that,
while a housing project may be uninhabitable because it "is not [legally] decent, safe, or
sanitary," it is not "necessarily functionally demolished"). To prove demolition, plaintiffs
would have to establish the existence of hazardous conditions which threaten the lives of
the tenants such as lead paint, asbestos or fire safety violations which threaten the lives of
the tenants. Id. Yet, the court in Velez held that, despite the fact that not all the units were
"demolished," plaintiffs could still be successful because they had been harmed by the
actions of the housing authority and HUD. Id. The court read the legislative history to
allow suits if the tenants were "threatened" and found that the vacancies and poor condi-
tions lead to this result. Id.
219. See Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (alleging that although the PHA did not formally apply for demolition
approval, the PHA constructively demolished the housing project by failing to make re-
pairs and allowing the project to exist in a deteriorated state); see PUBLIC HOUSING IN
PERIL, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that PHAs rarely apply for demolition when the project
is well-maintained and in good condition).
220. See Legal Assistance Foundation Interview, supra note 28 (commenting on the
withdrawn rule and HUD's losses in recent lawsuits). HUD is often named as a co-defend-
ant because it must enforce the statute. See Homer, 824 F. Supp. at 809 (filing class action
suit against Chicago Housing Authority and HUD); Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1259 (filing class
action suit against Chester Housing Authority and HUD). PHAs also often demand that
HUD join in suits to ensure satisfaction of any judgment. E.g., Legal Assistance Founda-
tion Interview, supra note 28 (describing that while the $200 million settlement package
offered by the Chicago Housing Authority was enticing, it needed the financial backing of
HUD before the tenants would seriously consider it).
221. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 5.
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proposed rule without providing for public comment to buttress its
chances in future litigation.222 HUD has not acknowledged this tactic
and instead has maintained that this proposed rule served to clarify and
implement § 1437p(d).223 Nonetheless, an intent provision would ease
HUD's task in litigating claims alleging de facto demolition.224 Following
the withdrawal of the proposed rule, HUD convened a meeting to discuss
future rulemaking on this issue.225
C. Alternative Solutions Proposed by Tenant and PHA Organizations
While the proposed rule was withdrawn, HUD has taken steps toward
proposing a new rulemaking to implement § 1437p(d).226 In so doing,
HUD's goal is to ensure that the maximum number of housing units re-
main available, while simultaneously protecting tenants from any unsafe
or unsanitary conditions.227
1. HUD's Preliminary Proposal
HUD's implementation strategy was to propose the development of
specific criteria to determine whether § 1437p(d) had been violated.228
Suggested criteria included high vacancy rates over a six to nine month
period, the length of response time to maintenance problems, and the
inadequacy of funds spent on maintenance as compared with other hous-
222. Id. The NHLP believes that because HUD has lost several times in court when
defending its position that de facto demolition should not be included under the statute
and that the statute only applies to intentional demolition, HUD used its rulemaking pow-
ers to implement an unsuccessful litigating position. Id.
223. See Final Demolition Rule, supra note 24, at 58,784.
224. See Attorney Interview, supra note 135 (discussing the difficulty facing tenants
who seek to prove intent).
225. See Shuldiner Letter, supra note 201 (inviting relevant housing groups to a meet-
ing at HUD to discuss future rulemaking).
226. See id. (informing various housing groups and authorities about the meeting and
asking them for their input into HUD's new rulemaking).
227. Id. (stating HUD's goal in implementing § 1437p(d)).
228. Id. (listing several of the acknowledged problems for which plaintiffs have been
filing suit); see Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (complaining of
vacant units that have been left unsecured and uninhabitable thereby attracting looters and
drug dealers; mounds of trash; rats and other vermin in the apartments; and broken or
missing windows, frames, counter tops and appliances).
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ing projects."' The issue of intent was noticeably absent from HUD's list
of proposed criteria.23°
HUD also proposed a year-long grace period to afford PHAs an oppor-
tunity to remedy deteriorated housing conditions.23' If the PHA and
HUD determined that the units were salvageable, the PHA could correct
the problems and return the units to the rent rolls.232 If, however, the
units were determined to be non-viable, the PHA could apply for demoli-
tion.233 At the end of the grace period, HUD would meet with the PHA
to determine whether the housing authority had complied with
§ 1437p(d)'s requirements.234 HUD's proposal, however, fails to specify
the conditions that would trigger the grace period.235 Presumably, HUD
would react to violations under § 1437p(d) and institute the year-long
grace period to establish a deadline by which the PHA would have to
remedy the problems.236
In implementing § 1437p, HUD regulations should seek to preserve
available housing units and remedy dangerous and unsanitary condi-
tions.237 HUD could enact the most effective rule by taking action to
prevent the large number of public housing units that are currently viable
from becoming distressed.238 Such a rule would satisfy both statutory
229. Shuldiner Letter, supra note 201; see also Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(suggesting a standard of proof for find-
ing violations under § 1437p). Criteria included a showing that defendants' actions were
likely to result in active or de facto demolition or that defendants' action had caused de
facto demolition through evidence of high vacancies or a high number of uninhabitable
units. Id.; see also supra note 123 (discussing possible criteria that a court would look to to
determine de facto demolition).
230. Shuldiner Letter, supra note 201 (lacking any reference to an intent provision).
231. Id. (anticipating that this grace period, during which PHAs would take required
steps toward rehabilitation or demolition, would deter PHAs from boarding up units and
allowing them to deteriorate).
232. Id.
233. Id. (presuming that by having to submit an application for demolition, this would
prevent PHAs from boarding up the dilapidated units).
234. Id.
235. See id. (proposing the adoption of a grace period but not defining how and when it
would be activated).
236. See Gutzman Letter, supra note 211 (criticizing HUD's proposal because it fo-
cused on "violation-based regulations" rather than focusing on what can be done before
violations occur).
237. See Harner, supra note 55, at 915 n.2 (explaining the policy goals of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437 (1982)).
238. See Schill, supra note 7, at 498-99. Professor Schill urged that cost-effective re-
pairs be made to prevent housing units from becoming distressed. Id. He then concluded
that once the cost of renovations exceeds the cost of new development, the projects should
be demolished and replaced. Id. at 540-41.
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policy and congressional goals.239 HUD's proposal set out a reasonable
goal, but its method of implementation would allow for substantial viola-
tions to occur before any solutions are determined.24
2. A Public Housing Representative's Suggestion
While HUD's idea may allow the projects to deteriorate, a comment
sent by a meeting invitee, a member of the Council of Large Public Hous-
ing Authorities (CLPHA), suggested that the regulation should seek to
determine the earliest possible action to prevent a slide towards deterio-
ration.24' CLPHA's proposal was to involve HUD's field office staff in
monitoring the status of housing authority units.242 Under this approach,
HUD would review units that remained vacant for a designated period of
time to determine whether rehabilitation or demolition would provide
the better solution.243
CLPHA's proposal urged the confrontation of problems at the outset
before significant deterioration, yet its method does not promote this
goal. The method is flawed because HUD's field office would monitor
the units by relying on the housing authority to apprise it of status
changes.244 Since a PHA's funding is often contingent upon maintaining
vacancy rates below a certain level,245 a PHA lacks a strong incentive to
inform HUD of increases in its vacancy rates. Additionally, the PHA
knows that disclosure of this information to HUD will result in increased
governmental oversight.246 Although CLPHA's proposal appropriately
239. See H.R. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25-26, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3341-42 (explaining the congressional goals in enacting § 1437p(d)).
240. See Gutzman Letter, supra note 211 and accompanying text (suggesting that,
rather than waiting until the violations occur, the focus should be on preventing such oc-
currence at the outset).
241. See id. (supporting a proactive response).
242. Id.
243. Id. The proposal suggested the development of a database of all of the housing
authority's units and assigning each unit a certain status based on occupancy such as "occu-
pied, vacant, deprogrammed, etc." Id. Through this database, HUD's field office would
be able to monitor each unit's status. Id.
244. See id. (suggesting the idea of a PHA/HUD partnership in monitoring the condi-
tion of housing projects).
245. Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP), 24 C.F.R.
§ 901.01(a)-(e) (1994). The PHMAP provides guidance and criteria by which to assess
housing authorities' management, performance, and disabilities. § 901.01(a). PHAs that
perform well are entitled to additional responsibility and flexibility. § 901.01(e); see
§ 901.10(b) (listing the indicators for assessing a PHA's management performance). The
first indicator is vacancy and various grades are awarded based on percentage of vacant
units. § 901.10(b)(I).
246. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 37 (referring to excessive HUD regulation as
"HUD's 'Regulatory Reign of Terror' " and describing how increased regulation stifles a
PHA's creative ideas and solutions to improve conditions and services for its tenants).
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suggested a joint strategy formulated by both the PHA and HUD, such
cooperation most likely would not occur until substantial violations had
taken place and the public housing project had greatly deteriorated.247
3. Incorporation of Existing Regulations
Of those invitees who submitted proposals, all agreed that they would
prefer a minimum amount of additional regulations and believed that
current regulations for other programs could be utilized.248 Using regula-
tions from other programs, the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP)
suggested that a PHA should not submit an application for demolition
unless the project was completely vacant.249 Under this method, the
PHA would submit the strategy for demolition in a five-year action plan
but would maintain the units at Housing Quality Standards (HQS)25° to
prevent the occurrence of de facto demolition.25'
247. See Gutzman Letter, supra note 211 (explaining that a meeting would not take
place until units had been vacant for a certain period of time). This vacancy period would
allow looters, vagrants, drug dealers and gang members to enter the units, much to the
detriment of the rest of the project. See Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (W.D.
Mo. 1990) (describing similar types of activities occurring in the Watkins Homes housing
project due to the large number of vacancies).
248. See Letter from Barrett Philpott, Chair, NAHRO Modernization Group, to Joseph
Shuldiner, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing, HUD (Apr. 8, 1994) (on file
with CATHOLIC UNIVERSrrY LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Philpott Letter] (stating that a
"minimum amount of 'new' regulations" would be necessary to implement § 1437p(d)); cf.
Stacy Letter, supra note 20 (suggesting that a set of new criteria to monitor violations
would be unnecessary).
249. Philpott Letter, supra note 248 (suggesting that this idea was at the crux of the
proposal and would prevent the need to maintain the units while the demolition applica-
tion was pending). Presumably, this application would be approved because there would
be zero occupancy and, therefore, no need to maintain units while an application for demo-
lition was pending. Id. HAP recognized, however, that if a PHA began to develop the
idea of demolition while the unit was still partially occupied, the problem of maintenance
would remain. Id.
250. 24 C.F.R. § 901.05q (1994) (defining HQS as Housing Quality Standards and indi-
cating where the text of these standards may be found).
251. Philpott Letter, supra note 248 (proposing the use of CIAP (Comprehensive Im-
provement Assistance Program) or CGP (Comprehensive Grant Program) funds for the
purpose of demolition). Specifically, CIAP funds are slated for modernization of public
housing. Schill, supra note 7, at 522. Projects may obtain these funds if the modernization
costs do not exceed 62.5% of their Total Development Costs (TDC). Id. TDC is mea-
sured by calculating the costs of planning, land purchase and construction of the housing
project. Id. In 1987, the CGP was created to supply PHAs owning projects with 500 or
more units with funds that could be used on expenses not exceeding over 90% of their
TDC. Id. HUD created a third program, entitled the Major Reconstruction of Obsolete
Programs (MROP), to supply PHAs with modernization funds. Id. Under this program
HUD could grant funds to PHAs for the rehabilitation of obsolete projects. Id. at 522-23.
By suggesting the use of CIAP or CGP funds, HQS standards and the Public Housing
Management Assessment Program (requiring that units be maintained according to HQS
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The HAP proposal, however, fails to question why there would be a
need for demolition if the units can be maintained at HQS.252 If the
PHA maintained these standards until just before submission of the ap-
plication, there would be no reason for the project to be 100% vacant,
since meeting the HQS standards is a strong indication of viability.
253
Despite HUD's involvement of tenant groups in the rulemaking pro-
cess, no concrete plan emerged from the April 15 meeting, leaving the
issue of intent unresolved.254 Demonstrating the unsettled nature of this
issue, HUD's letter inviting participants outlined its goals for the imple-
mentation of § 1437p(d) and omitted mention of an intent provision.255
Since an intent requirement would be in HUD's best interest,256 it is un-
clear as to how this issue will be addressed in future rulemaking.25 7
Recent case law also has shown that the issue of intent remains far
from settled. While the courts in Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago
Housing Authority and Velez v. Cisneros have rejected intent as an ele-
standards), HAP attempted to offer a means to avoid the creation of new regulations to
implement § 1437p(d) by consolidating these three overlapping regulations. Philpott Let-
ter, supra.
HAP's proposal is correct in its conclusion that zero occupancy would be a large factor
weighing toward approval. Cf Rejection Letter, supra note 20 (rejecting a PHA's applica-
tion for partial demolition of the Henry Homer Annex and professing confusion as to why
the PHA would apply to demolish the Henry Homer Annex when other projects under
Chicago Housing Authority jurisdiction had a much higher vacancy rate). See also
Ihejirika, Homer Residents Fight for Home, supra note 43 (reporting that critics of the
PHA application could not understand why the Homer Annex was being targeted for
demolition when Homer Homes and the Homer Extension had much higher vacancy
rates); Maudlyne Ihejirika, Homer Annex Residents Face 2-Year Housing Wait, CHI. SUN-
TImEs, Aug. 11, 1994, at 4 (commenting that many residents believed the Annex will be
razed because it is located near the site of the 1996 Democratic National Convention).
252. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (mandating that HUD may
approve demolition only if there is no reasonable plan of modifications that can be admin-
istered to restore the project to health).
253. See 24 C.F.R. § 901.10(b)(7) (1994) (describing one of the criterion for evaluation
under the Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP) as the annual in-
spection of units including the percentage of units the PHA inspected using Housing Qual-
ity Standards).
254. See Housing Specialist Interview, supra note 33 (indicating that the meeting par-
ticipants failed to agree on any formal plan).
255. Shuldiner Letter, supra note 201 (omitting any mention of an intent provision, and
failing to expressly state that the provision had been discarded).
256. See Legal Assistance Foundation Interview, supra note 28 (postulating that HUD
may have proposed the intent rule because of adverse verdicts in de facto demolition litiga-
tion); see supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing HUD's possible motive for
including an intent provision).
257. Assistant General Counsel Interview, supra note 31 (explaining that no action had
been taken on the rulemaking issue since the April, 1994 meeting and that HUD was still
standing by its position).
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ment of proof for de facto demolition,25 8 the opposite decision in Gomez
v. Housing Authority remains.259 Yet, in addition to the question of in-
tent, the elements of proof in an action for de facto demolition are also
unclear. As an example, a recent District of Columbia Housing Author-
ity statement explained that demolition encompassed only actual
demolition.26 °
III. STOPPING DE FACro DEMOLITION BEFORE IT STARTS: A
DIFFICULT GOAL WITH PUBLIC HOUSING
Many public housing authorities view the current demolition rules as a
"legal Catch-22., 26 1 Under certain circumstances, demolition may be the
most cost-effective option. For example, some projects are so dilapidated
that the costs of renovation and modernization could fund the cost of new
homes. 262 Yet, to have an application for demolition approved, a PHA
must meet, among other requirements, the prerequisite of being able to
provide one-for-one housing replacement.263 The catch is that the major-
ity of HUD funding in this area is designated for rehabilitation and mod-
ernization, not for replacement. 26 While this requirement furthers the
congressional intent of preserving the number of units available, many
258. See Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824 F. Supp. 808, 819
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (concluding that intent was not an essential element of a cause of action for
de facto demolition); Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1273 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating
that the plaintiffs did not have to prove intent).
259. See Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd
without op. sub nom., Gomez v. City of El Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 198 (1994) (holding that tenants had to prove that the PHA had a policy to
precipitate de facto demolition by a preponderance of the evidence).
260. Serge F. Kovaleski, D.C. Asks Judge to Defer Putting Housing Agency in Receiver-
ship, WASH. PosT, Sept. 28, 1994, at B7. In a motion to prevent District of Columbia
Superior Court Judge Steffen W. Graae from placing the Department of Public and As-
sisted Housing into receivership, the District challenged Judge Graae's contention that the
Authority's high vacancy rate constituted grounds for de facto demolition and a violation
of federal law by arguing that the statute does not cover "inaction, omission or neglect."
Id.
261. Marc Guidry, Demolition Only Salvation for Desire Residents, THE TIMES-PICA-
Yuru, Oct. 3, 1994, at B4. The article focused on the Housing Authority of New Orleans's
Desire housing project which was built on an unsafe landfill with substandard materials;
maintained an occupancy rate below 50%; was rodent, termite and sewage-infested; and
endured substantial drug-related crime. Id. The Housing Authority argued that renova-
tion was the only option because demolition required one-for-one replacement and the
Housing Authority lacked the funds for such replacement. Id.
262. Cf. id. (stating that the cost of renovating one apartment in the Desire project was
$66,000, which would be enough money to purchase a new home).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (mandating that a PHA must
have developed a plan to replace every demolished unit with an additional unit). For the
text of § 1437p(b), see supra note 20.
264. Guidry, supra note 261, at B4 (reporting that while Congress requires PHAs to
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housing authorities view it as extremely onerous.265 In response, Con-
gress began reviewing the one-for-one replacement requirement during
its 1994 term, but failed to pass legislation that would have eliminated the
rule.
26 6
replace all demolished units, Congress's major funding programs do not allocate funds for
replacement, only for modernization).
265. See Stacy Letter, supra note 20 (asking HUD whether there is HUD or congres-
sional support for changing the one-for-one replacement housing requirement); Gutzman
Letter, supra note 211 (suggesting a process by which PHAs could raze projects that war-
ranted demolition while keeping the land until replacement funds were allocated or vouch-
ers issued).
The one-for-one replacement requirement was first introduced in 1979 and later codified
in the Housing & Community Development Act of 1987 as § 1437p(b). PUBLIC HOUSING
IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 79 n.170. In the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Subcommittee's Report of 1987, House members stated that the purpose of the require-
ment was to mitigate the effects of a demolition on the tenants. H.R. REP. No. 122(l),
supra note 70, at 25, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341. The House members also
determined that replacement housing could be accomplished through additional public
housing units or "project-based subsidies," such as Section 8 vouchers. Id.
Section 8 housing was created under the Housing and Community Act of 1974, and
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988). Green, supra note 47, at 695. This housing is owned
by private parties who contract with a PHA to provide units to low-income families. Id.
Generally, tenants are required to pay 30% of their income in rent and HUD subsidizes
the difference between the tenant's rent and the fair market value. Federally Assisted
Housing: Expanding HUD's Options for Dealing with Physically Distressed Properties, Oct.
6, 1994: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Housing and Aviation of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (Statement of
Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development Issues, Re-
sources, Community, and Economic Development Division, GAO) [hereinafter OPTIONS
FOR DISTRESSED PROPERTIES]. Under the program, tenants receive vouchers that repre-
sent the fair market value of the property. Green, supra note 48, at 695. For a more in-
depth look at costs associated with rehabilitation, see OPrIONS FOR DISTRESSED PROPER-
I-ms 239. See H.R. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25-26, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341-42 (explaining the congressional goals in enacting § 1437p(d)). For
an in-depth look the difference between the replacement housing and Section 8 vouchers,
see generally Schill, supra note 7, at 526-40 (discussing the differences between these two
alternatives for providing replacement housing).
The cost of replacement housing is often extremely high. Laurie Niles, Housing Board
OKs Fontenelle Replacements, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 21, 1995, at 23 (sunrise edi-
tion). To demolish the Logan Fontenelle South public housing project would cost $2 mil-
lion, whereas purchasing 194 replacement units would cost $17.2 million. Id
As part of Secretary Cisneros's plan to reform HUD, the Clinton Administration is con-
sidering eliminating the requirement. Allie Shah, CHA Starts to Topple Image as High-
Rise Prison for Poor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1995, § 1, at 7. Nevertheless, if the replacement
rule is abolished, advocates for low-income housing worry that this action will radically
reduce the number of units available to low-income residents. Id. See also Ihejirika, CHA
Races GOP Ax on Replacement Plan, supra note 20, at 15 (explaining that if the one-for-
one replacement rule is abolished, the replacement housing slated to go to residents after
the demolition of their projects will be in jeopardy).
266. Guidry, supra note 261, at B4 (reporting that a waiver of the rule was passed by
the House of Representatives in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1994).
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The difficulties of following the replacement rule may cause PHAs to
hesitate in submitting an application for demolition.267 Even worse, the
PHAs may also continue to avoid routine repairs and maintenance due to
excuses ranging from lack of funds to mismanagement.268 This may cause
a housing project to decline into a state of demolition and, absent adher-
ence to statutory requirements, trigger a violation of § 1437p(d). 269 As
the costs of replacement housing continue to be high and enforcement of
§ 1437p(d) remains unsettled,27° PHAs continue to engage in de facto
demolition.27'
Due to many of the problems inherent in public housing,272 effective
enforcement of § 1437p(d) remains essential.2 73 De facto demolition re-
sults in great harm to tenants and ought to be prevented.274 Therefore,
But see Flynn McRoberts, Door Shut on Plan to Transform CHA, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1994,
§ 1, at 1 (reporting that the legislation failed to pass the Senate having been pushed aside
by the Republicans until after the November 1994 elections). In addition to the waiver, the
Act would have allocated more funding for replacement housing and less for moderniza-
tion. Id. at 14.
267. E.g., McRoberts, CHA Spending Choices: Safety or Maintenance, supra note 96, at
C1 (reporting that until the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), constructs replacement
housing and gets tenant approval for demolition, it would not obtain demolition approval
from HUD, and that the CHA should be monitored to determine whether the federal
funds allocated to the housing authority are being effectively spent on maintenance).
268. E.g., Guidry, supra note 261, at B4 (reporting that funds were allocated to emer-
gency inspections and repairs as well as security costs, as opposed to routine maintenance).
269. See Stacy Letter, supra note 20 (indicating that the replacement rule was one of
the greatest deterrents in demolishing unsafe housing units). Before introducing his sug-
gestions, Stacy requested that HUD consider changing the one-for-one replacement rule
and argued that the rule forced PHAs to continue funding non-viable units when the funds
could be better spent on viable units. Id.
270. See Kovaleski, D.C. Asks Judge to Defer Putting Housing Authority in Receiver-
ship, supra note 260, at B7 (highlighting that the definition of de facto demolition contin-
ues to be unclear).
271. See also Steve Bates, The Berg Still Mired in Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1994, at
Va. 1 (reporting on the contentious debate in Alexandria, Virginia about whether to de-
molish the Old Town public housing project and construct new homes on the site or
whether to rehabilitate the current project).
272. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 36 (describing problems endemic to public housing
in the 1990s).
273. See McRoberts, CHA Spending Choices: Safety or Maintenance, supra note 96, at
C1 (describing many of the funding problems yet reporting that funds must still be spent
on routine maintenance); see also McRoberts, Door Shut on Plan to Transform CHA,
supra note 266, at 1 (reporting that until the Chicago Housing Authority receives funds for
demolition, it will have to continue to budget for maintenance costs). These articles show
that funding problems make it difficult for housing authorities to make necessary repairs
and, without the requirements of § 1437p(d), there may be numerous instances of de facto
demolition.
274. See Maudlyne Ihejirika, No Money and No Repairs; Rundown Units Stand Empty
As Thousands Wait for Homes, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 5, 1994, at 6 (illustrating the disas-
trous effects of vacancy including vandalism, gang activity, drug dealing, and prostitution).
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after the withdrawal of HUD's final rule, the question remains as to how
to best implement § 1437p(d) to accomplish the statutory policy goals275
and to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on PHAs or tenants.
HUD's proposed rule requiring a showing of intent is an ineffective
and overly burdensome means and fails to comport with the legislative
history.276 While the court in Velez v. Cisneros found that there was a
sufficient showing of negligence and a high number of vacancies to estab-
lish that de facto demolition had occurred, 277 plaintiffs' counsel admitted
that she probably could not have proven the Chester Housing Authority's
intent to demolish.278 An intent requirement would make it more diffi-
cult to bring a successful suit and may discourage tenants from doing
so, 2 7 9 ultimately frustrating the implementation of § 1437p(d), 280 and ren-
dering the statute toothless.
Additionally, § 1437p(d) litigation has been the most effective means
for residents to halt the deterioration of their living conditions. 281 While
the ACC requires a PHA to maintain its units,282 tenants have no cause
of action to enforce these provisions.283 So long as § 1437p(d) remains
275. Harner, supra note 55, at 915 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982) and noting the
statute's policy goals to be "assist[ing] the several States ... to remedy the unsafe and
unsanitary... dwellings for families of lower income and.., to vest in local public housing
authorities the maximum amount of responsibility ... ").
276. See generally supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (explaining the legislative
history of § 1437p(d)). The legislative history makes clear that Congress wanted to main-
tain available housing and specified that the units were to be demolished only if there was
no hope of their rehabilitation. See H.R. Rm,. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 25-56, reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3341-42. Yet, an intent provision would make this preservation
more difficult as plaintiffs would have a more onerous burden of proof. See Edwards v.
District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Will, J., dissenting) (noting that
the plaintiffs would have a difficult time proving that the local government had engaged in
a plan to circumvent the statute).
277. Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that the plain-
tiffs were successful in proving intent although it was not a required element of the cause of
action).
278. Attorney Interview, supra note 137 (commenting on the intent provision and
Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
279. See supra note 276 (discussing the difficulties the intent provision would create for
plaintiffs).
280. Cf Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1273 n.7 (finding that, because the congressional goal
was to preserve the number of units available, it was irrelevant whether the PHA demol-
ished the project through intentional or unintentional means, since either method would
violate Congress's intent).
281. NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4 (explaining the necessity of keeping § 1437p(d)
as workable as possible because it has been an effective litigation tool).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (j)(1)(B)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring that funds shall
be allocated only if the public housing is maintained according to prescribed standards).
283. Velez, 850 F. Supp. at 1276-77 (holding that nothing in the ACC allows a plaintiff
to bring a cause of action under the ACC unless that plaintiff is a bondholder or the PHA);
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the only effective enforcement measure that tenants may utilize to chal-
lenge deteriorated conditions, its viability should not be undermined by
the imposition of an intent provision.284
As an alternative, HUD could use existing regulations pertaining to
demolition to implement the statute.285 For example, prior to demolition,
a PHA is required to develop its application in consultation with ten-
ants.28 6 Meaningful tenant consultation should occur before the PHA de-
velops a plan for demolition to permit the discussion of possible
alternatives or to plan for replacement housing.287 In fact, because mean-
ingful tenant consultation often prevents de facto demolition, it should
occur regardless of whether the PHA intends to demolish the housing
development.288
Resident initiatives are one of the criteria that HUD uses to evaluate
PHAs under the Public Housing Management Assessment Program
(PHMAP).2 89 The goal of this factor is to encourage partnerships be-
tween the PHA and the residents to develop safe, sanitary, drug-free
units that are viable and allow tenants to become more self-sufficient.29 °
HUD then evaluates whether the PHA has developed and encouraged
policies to promote safety; including reducing drug activities, resident
management, self-sufficiency, and homeownership. 29'
see also supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing the standing tenants have to
sue under the ACC).
284. See NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4 (explaining the effectiveness of § 1437p(d) in
actions for maintenance, neglect, and inaction).
285. See Philpott Letter, supra note 248 (suggesting that existing regulations should be
sufficient).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b) (1982).
287. Krislov, supra note 15, at 1747-48, 1752-53 (finding that meaningful tenant consul-
tation does not occur and asserting that communication between tenant groups and man-
agement can help to increase tenant support for an eventual demolition). Krislov defines
meaningful tenant consultation as informed involvement by tenants in a proposed demoli-
tion or sale that allows tenants to suggest alternatives and to participate in future planning.
Id. at 1747.
288. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 37-38 (discussing ways that public housing can be
improved, including participation on resident councils).
289. 24 C.F.R. § 901.10(b)(11) (1994).
290. Id.
291. Id. To gain a grade of "A" in this category, PHAs must show that there is substan-
tial improvement in three areas at one or more developments. Id. at § 901.10(b)(i). Con-
versely, the grades decrease as the amount of activity decreases. Id. at (i)-(vi).
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PHAs could work toward increasing tenant involvement in the
projects2" by building on the PHMAP criteria.293 The goal would be to
encourage tenant oversight of maintenance problems, by alerting the
PHAs when there are problems and by establishing a more efficient sys-
tem of response on the part of the PHAs, as well as training tenants to
remedy simple maintenance problems.294
The goal of § 1437p(d) is to prevent any action that results in demoli-
tion or disposition in order to preserve the number of available units.295
Instead of waiting for violations to occur, HUD could incorporate ex-
292. Active resident involvement is already a common feature of many housing projects
across the country. See generally OFFICE OF RESIDENT INITIATIVES, HUD, RESIDENT INI-
TIATIVES: EXAMPLES OF POLICIES AND PROGRAMS (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter INITIATIVES].
Much of this tenant involvement is in the form of resident management. Id. at 25. Resi-
dent management is a plan through which residents of public housing projects take over
part or all of the PHA's management responsibilities. Id. Resident Management Corpo-
rations (RMC) provide management services often encompassing security, child care, em-
ployment opportunities and medical services. Id.
HUD's involvement with RMCs began in 1975 with the National Tenant Management
Demonstration, and in 1987, Congress passed § 20 as part of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1987. ICF INC., OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH,
HUD, REPORT ON EMERGING RESIDENT MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS IN PUBLIC Hous-
ING 1-1 (Jan. 1993). This section authorized HUD to issue Technical Assistance Grants
(TAG) to emerging RMCs to support the development of resident involvement. Id.
Through efficient management practices RMCs are allowed to retain the unused portion of
the funds and apply these funds to services or improvements for the project. Id.
Typically RMCs are run by a board of seven to nine residents elected by the residents of
the project. INITIATIVES, supra, at 25. For a compilation of model by-laws as well as a
guide to organizing and maintaining tenant initiatives, see OFFICE OF RESIDENT INITIA-
TIVES, HUD, GUIDE TO DEVELOPING TENANT OPPORTUNITIES (1994).
Examples of success stories by RMCs that revitalized deteriorated, hopeless, public
housing projects are ones like the Cochran Gardens in St. Louis, Mo. SUCCESS STORIES,
supra note 214, at 4-5. After forming an RMC, the residents contracted with the PHA to
perform janitorial services for the project, an operation which employs 12 residents and
grants stipends to 30 other residents. Id. at 4. In addition, Cochran Gardens has made vast
improvements in maintenance, replacing boarded up windows with panes and maintaining
lawns and flower beds, as well as cutting vacancy rates in half. Id. at 5. This and other
success stories provide evidence that resident involvement can improve maintenance and
management. Id. at 1.
293. See also Philpott Letter, supra note 248 (indicating that there should be a mini-
mum amount of new regulations to implement § 18(d)).
294. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 38 (encouraging housing authorities to involve
tenants in improving their living conditions); see Krislov, supra note 15, at 1754 (suggesting
that tenant monitoring could help curb PHA practices of leaving units vacant to facilitate
demolition); see also 2 Kevin Neary, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCE,
HUD, CASE STUDIES OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES WITHIN PUBLIC HOUSING
AGENCIES, MAINTENANCE AND CUSTODIAL (1985) (distinguishing between maintenance
and custodial activities and including case studies illustrating such practices in a large, me-
dium, and small PHAs).
295. See H.R. CONG. REP. No. 122(I), supra note 70, at 26, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3342 (specifying Congress's intent in enacting § 1437p(d)).
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isting regulations that govern demolition and attempt to repair mainte-
nance problems at the earliest opportunity.296
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last decade, public housing has faced difficult challenges. Ten-
ants have become poorer, the supply of available housing has diminished,
and the federal government has reduced its funding. Yet, a large supply
of viable public housing units across the country remain. To preserve
these projects and units, HUD should carefully consider the effect of its
rules on tenants, PHAs, and HUD. While HUD's proposed rule to imple-
ment § 1437p(d) included an intent provision, this requirement would
have made it more difficult to enforce the statute, whose goal is the pres-
ervation of public housing. In the wake of the withdrawal of the rule, de
facto demolition, the elements of proof for a cause of action and the ne-
cessity of proving intent all remain unsettled issues. In initiating future
rulemaking, HUD must conform to congressional intent but also must
utilize proactive methods of preventing violations.
Julia Clayton Powell
296. See NHLP Paper, supra note 33, at 4 (advocating that steps should be taken at the
earliest possible time to prevent de facto demolition); see PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, supra
note 1, at 72-73 (criticizing the current demolition approval process which allows viola-
tions to occur before HUD can respond).
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